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Collateral Damages: Domestic Monetary Compensation
for Civilians in Asymmetric Conflict
Gilat J. Bachar*

Abstract
The armed conflicts of the twenty-first century, which often take place among civilian
populations rather than on traditional battlefields, push states to acknowledge and rectify the
resulting harm to foreign civilians. In particular, asymmetric conflicts, which involve confronting
non-state actors within civilian populations, tend to cause more of what has come to be known
as ‘collateral damage.’ Such harm to civilians can be inflicted, for instance, in checkpoint
shootings, drone attacks, or riot control efforts. How should these losses be addressed? This
Article examines two competing models. The U.S. military provides compensation to civilians
injured by its activity in Iraq and Afghanistan through a military-run program, governed by
the Foreign Claims Act and condolence payments. In contrast, Israel enables non-citizen
Palestinians injured by Israeli military actions to bring tort lawsuits before Israeli civil courts.
Notwithstanding the differences between these two conflicts, both entail military forces engaging
with civilians while assuming quasi-military or policing roles. Yet, scholars have not yet
juxtaposed the distinct compensation mechanisms applied in each conflict, vis-à-vis the goals of
monetary damages under tort law. This Article seeks to fill this gap. Drawing on tort theory,
social psychology, and socio-legal studies, the Article examines the structure of domestic conflict
compensation programs. It utilizes data from public records, interviews with relevant
*
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stakeholders, NGO reports, and Freedom of Information Act requests to compare the
American and Israeli compensation paradigms. Through this analysis, the Article offers
guidelines for designing compensation programs that address both government accountability and
victims’ needs to effectively redress the harm modern-day conflict causes to civilians.
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“Services: Death of Wife / Qty: 1 / Unit Price: $2,500”
U.S. Government Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher, Afghanistan, June
20051
“The death of any innocent person, let alone a young boy, is a terrible tragedy . . . but
this does not justify imposing liability on the State and on the soldiers.”
CC (Haifa) 94/14685 Estate of Abu Hatla v. The State of Israel (2004)2

I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Twenty-first century armed conflicts often target non-state actors rather
than another nation-state’s army. In particular, asymmetric conflicts—by which I
mean conflicts between belligerents whose relative military power or strategy
differ significantly3—tend to move away from traditional battlefields and into
heavily populated areas, causing more “collateral damage” to non-combatant
civilians.4 Security forces may negligently cause incidental bodily injuries and
property damages to civilians, for instance, in checkpoint shootings, drone
attacks, riot control efforts, and even car accidents. This changing military
landscape presses states to address the losses such warfare inflicts upon innocent
civilians.5 This Article examines two civilian compensation models used in
asymmetric conflicts—Israel-Palestine and U.S.-Iraq and Afghanistan.
Notwithstanding the differences between the two conflicts, both share the
characteristic of confronting non-state actors that operate from within civilian
populations, often using them as a human shield.6 Furthermore, both involve
1

U.S. Government Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher (May 16, 2005), http://perma.cc/SC43XEPC.

2

CC 14685/94 Estate of Abu Hatla v. State of Israel (2004) (Isr.).
There are various types of asymmetric conflicts. In this Article, I discuss two types of such
conflicts, both of which involve confrontation between military forces and non-state actors:
prolonged military occupation and counterinsurgency operations (sometimes called “wars on
terror”). See MICHAEL L. GROSS, MORAL DILEMMAS OF MODERN WAR: TORTURE, ASSASSINATION,
AND BLACKMAIL IN AN AGE OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 13–20 (2010); BRAD ROBERTS, INST. FOR
DEF. ANALYSES, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY: ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 2010 (2000)
(noting the growing share of asymmetric conflicts in armed conflicts around the world).

3

4

5
6

See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2008); Rupert Smith, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD (2007); H.R. McMaster, On War: Lessons to Be Learned, 50 SURVIVAL 19 (2008).
At least those that respect the rule of law.
Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War
Waged by a Democratic State against Terrorism, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445 (2002) (discussing the
moral dilemmas of democratic states fighting terrorist organizations that both target and hide
amongst innocent civilians).
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military forces performing policing and quasi-military—rather than strictly
military—roles, such as controlling volatile riots. By comparing the
compensation paradigms applied in each conflict, I offer guidelines for designing
programs to effectively address the harm modern-day conflict causes to civilians.
Traditionally, scholars examined compensation for armed conflict victims
either through International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law
(HRL) in an ongoing conflict,7 or through Transitional Justice (TJ) in the
aftermath of a conflict.8 These international law frameworks are called upon
since states typically fail to address this issue themselves.9 However, IHL norms
of armed conflict tolerate (and do not demand compensation for) a civilian harm
as long as there were reasonable attempts to ensure that the distinction between
civilians and combatants was upheld. These attempts are reasonable if civilians
are not deliberately targeted, and as long as harm to civilians, when it does occur,
is deemed proportional to military objectives.10 HRL, in turn, tends to target
intentional, gross human rights violations, such as torture, rather than negligent
acts,11 which are the focus of this Article. Because of the limitations of IHL and
HRL in protecting civilians, the overall weakness of international tribunals in a
world still committed to state sovereignty,12 and the general focus of TJ on post-

7

8

9
10

11

12

For a review of IHL norms that govern compensation for victims of armed conflict, see Yossi
Wolfson, The Double-edged Sword of the Combat Action Rule, 16 HA’MISHPAT BA’RESHET 3, 5 (2013)
(Hebrew); YAEL STEIN, B’TSELEM, GETTING OFF SCOT-FREE: ISRAEL’S REFUSAL TO COMPENSATE
PALESTINIANS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY ITS SECURITY FORCES 7–8 (Shuli Wilkansky ed.,
Michelle Bubis trans., 2017), http://perma.cc/2RVR-G6GD.
See, for example, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 157 (2004); Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine:
Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru's Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 51 (2007).
See discussion in Section B.1.
See, for example, DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW (2006); EYAL WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL
POSSIBLE EVILS: HUMANITARIAN VIOLENCE FROM ARENDT TO GAZA (2011).
See, for example, the protection afforded to the right to life under the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) during armed conflict. ECHR does not
subject this right to the laws of armed conflict, thus limiting the scope of its protection.
Furthermore, the right to bodily integrity is not expressly provided for, except where the violation
of bodily integrity is intentional, as is the case when it constitutes torture, inhuman or degrading
punishment, or medical experimentation. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, 3, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 44, http://perma.cc/2SRW-Y9TM.
Yael Ronen, Avoid or Compensate-Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflections during Armed
Conflict, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181 (2009) (discussing the failure of IHL and HRL to ensure
compensation for civilians injured during lawful military operations and the limited ability of
international tribunals to offer compensation to victims); Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the
War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1795 (2009) (noting that there is no
provision in IHL for the compensation of civilian victims).
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(rather than amid-) conflict,13 there is a gap in current international law
scholarship regarding government accountability for negligent acts conducted in
ongoing asymmetric conflicts. This Article thus explores the role of existing
domestic compensation tools, such as military payments and tort lawsuits, in
promoting accountability in asymmetric conflicts between democratic, rule-oflaw-adhering states and non-state actors.
In the U.S., the military provides payments to civilians injured in its
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in two ways: through an administrative
program, governed by the Foreign Claims Act (FCA), and through solatia/
condolence payments.14 The FCA provides the U.S. military its primary tool to
compensate local civilians for losses unrelated to combat operations, like car
accidents caused by security forces. Claims according to the FCA are evaluated
by Foreign Claims Commissions, composed of military officers, in a
standardized bureaucratic process.15 Since 2003, the average payment according
to the FCA for loss of life is $4,200.16 Alongside the FCA regime, the military
also grants condolence payments: symbolic, ex gratia payments offered in claims
deemed related to combat, in amounts typically no higher than $2,500 per
person killed.17 In contrast, in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, a unique
mechanism enables non-citizen Palestinians from the West Bank and—until
recently—the Gaza Strip (the Palestinian Territories; the Territories), to bring
civil lawsuits for damages against the State of Israel before Israeli civil courts, for
injuries resulting from Israel’s security forces’ actions in the Territories.18
While the U.S.’s military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan is a
(relatively) short-term counterinsurgency operation conducted miles away from
its territory and citizens, Israel’s presence in the adjacent Territories has
continued, with changes in degree and scope, over the last fifty years, with no
13

In recent years there have been voices in TJ literature arguing that it should be applied to ongoing
conflicts, but this area of scholarship is still nascent. See, for example, Cyanne E. Loyle, Transitional
Justice During Armed Conflict, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICS (2017),
http://perma.cc/GQ7G-7CZL; Par Engstrom, Transitional Justice and Ongoing Conflict, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACEBUILDING ON THE GROUND: VICTIMS AND EX-COMBATANTS
41–61 (Chandra Lekha Sriram et. al. eds., 2013) (discussing ways in which TJ is increasingly
embedded in conflict resolution efforts and evaluating the recent trend towards judicial
intervention in ongoing conflicts).

14

See discussion in Section III.B.2.
Id.

15
16

See Marla B. Keenan & Jonathan Tracy, CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, US MILITARY CLAIMS
SYSTEM FOR CIVILIANS (2008), http://perma.cc/F3SN-TY6P.

17

Smaller amounts are allocated for bodily injury and property damage. See Section III.B.
I refer to non-Israeli citizen Palestinians, as opposed to Israel’s Arab minority. Foreign nationals
are also entitled to bring claims, but since these are less common, and for brevity, I refer to
plaintiffs as Palestinians.

18
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end in sight. Arguably, the Israeli occupation imposes on Israel a different set of
obligations towards Palestinians compared to those owed by the U.S. to Iraqi
and Afghan civilians.19 Despite these differences, it is fruitful to compare the
compensation models each conflict represents and examine them vis-à-vis the
goals of monetary compensation under tort doctrine and the unique
characteristics of conflict settings.20 Not only will this comparison illustrate the
dilemmas involved in designing victim compensation programs in asymmetric
conflict, it will also illuminate the motivations underlying such programs. The
U.S. Army trumpets damages payments as one way to win the hearts and minds
of civilians in war zones.21 But do these payments actually help achieve this goal?
And should such a goal even underlie victim compensation programs? Israel,
conversely, does not purport to win Palestinians’ hearts and minds, but rather
describes Palestinians’ access to its courts as an unparalleled, generous standing
given to them as parties to an armed conflict.22 However, Israel has significantly
restricted Palestinians’ access to civil justice over the last fifteen years.23
19

20

21

22

In this sense, while Israelis see themselves as the ingroup and Palestinians as the outgroup, in the
U.S./Iraq and Afghanistan relationships both sides seem to be outgroups. This categorization
may affect decision-making in various contexts, including compensation. Cf. Lawrence A. Messe
et. al., Group Categorization and Distributive Justice Decisions, in JUSTICE IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 227
(Hans Werner Bierhoff et al. eds., 1986) (exploring how group categorization processes can
mediate the perceived applicability of one’s sense of justice to reward distribution decisions).
While other countries, including the U.K., Australia, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands,
offer payments to injured civilians, less information is available concerning these mechanisms.
With respect to Canada, for example, evidence of payments was leaked out by way of a report to
the Receiver General in 2010, which revealed that C$650,000 was distributed in Afghanistan
between 2008 and 2009. However, further information has been difficult to acquire. See
AMSTERDAM INT’L LAW CLINIC & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, MONETARY PAYMENTS FOR
CIVILIAN HARM IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PRACTICE (2013), http://perma.cc/2PN2HCXB; Tristana Moore, Anger Mounts in Germany Over Its Afghan Air Strike, TIME (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://perma.cc/5NQE-374V. The U.K.’s system is similar to the U.S.’s. Like the U.S., the
British used in Iraq and Afghanistan a “table of standard injury and death payments to guide
them. It includes suggested awards of $200 for minor injuries, $240 for the loss of a toe, $1,000
for the loss of an eye and $7,000 for the amputation of both feet.” Crina Boros et al., A Few
Thousand Dollars: The Price of Life for Civilians Killed in War Zones, THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION
(Jul. 16, 2014), http://perma.cc/H7WT-7LKG; Iraq War Compensation Total at £9m, THE
GUARDIAN (Jun. 16, 2010). While the Israeli model is rare, its basic structure bears similarities to
claims brought in the U.S. under statutes like the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Torture Victim
Protection Act, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 1–2 (2007) (presenting
damages payments as an important tool in asymmetric conflicts). This tool is used alongside
development strategies such as economic reconstruction. See Eli Berman et. al., Can Hearts and
Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 119 J. POL. ECON. 766 (2011) (discussing
reconstruction spending in Iraq as part of a “winning hearts and minds” strategy).
See Position paper by the Chief Military Prosecutor, submitted on Dec. 19, 2010 to the Public
Commission for Examining the Maritime Incident of May 31, 2010 headed by former Supreme
Court Justice Jacob Turkel, 75–77, http://perma.cc/N9HX-MM46; Interview with GL9, IDF,
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The Article draws upon originally collected and publicly available data,
including interviews with relevant stakeholders;24 Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests; reports by non-governmental organizations; and legislative
materials to evaluate each of the models. In so doing, the Article demonstrates
that, while both compensation models have significant problems, Israel’s original
tort-based model promises to better promote the threefold goal of adequate
compensation, government accountability, and victim participation. Not only
does the Article help grapple with the consequences of simmering, intractable
asymmetric conflicts, it also explores the role of domestic tools on issues often
left to the international legal system.
The Article proceeds in five Sections. Section II examines the benefits and
flaws of tort-based and no-fault compensation, both in general and as applied to
asymmetric conflicts. Section III provides background on Israel’s and the U.S.’s
compensation programs. Section IV compares these two models. Section V
offers guidelines for designing compensation programs based on the tort system,
while acknowledging its limitations and allowing an opt-out option for victims
who prefer an administrative compensation program. Finally, the conclusion
puts forward future research recommendations, suggesting that we need more
empirical data on victims’ needs in conflict settings to better shape our
compensation and accountability regimes.

II. T ORT L ITIGATION VS . N O -F AULT M ECHANISMS IN
A SYMMETRIC C ONFLICT
What are the promises and perils of tort law and how do the unique
characteristics of asymmetric conflict affect these objectives? To what extent do
(Dec. 2016) (notes on file with author) (noting that it is impossible for the Israeli military to win
the hearts and minds of the Palestinian population through money damages given the longstanding animosity between the two peoples).
23

24

See Gilat J. Bachar, Access Denied—Using Procedure to Restrict Tort Litigation: Lessons from the IsraeliPalestinian Experience, 92 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 841 (2018) (exploring various barriers Palestinians
face in bringing claims against the Israeli government). Even prior to introducing these
restrictions on Palestinians’ access to civil justice, most successful claims ended with confidential
out-of-court settlements.
Originally collected interviews refer to the Israeli-Palestinian case. I conducted the interviews
during four trips to Israel between June 2014 and July 2016, and in phone or Skype calls. I
analyzed and anonymized the interview transcripts, which were originally in Hebrew (rarely in
English), using the mixed methods application “Dedoose.” Government lawyers (GL) include
three sub-groups: lawyers from the District Attorney’s Office (DA) who represent the State in
court; lawyers from the Israeli Ministry of Justice (MOJ) involved in legislation proceedings; and
lawyers from the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD), the defendant in the claims. Plaintiffs are
represented by private lawyers (PL) or human rights NGO lawyers (NGOL) licensed to practice
in Israel.
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alternative compensation models better respond to victims’ needs? This Section
addresses these questions.

A. The Objectives and Benefits of Tort Law
Tort law has a variety of aims, including deterring harmful behavior,
offering a mechanism for remedying wrongs, allocating the costs of injuries, and
providing compensation to those who are injured.25 Traditional accounts of tort
law focus on its result-oriented objectives. Some scholars mark deterrence as the
primary objective, namely creating incentives for desirable behavior and
disincentives for unacceptable behavior,26 while others theorize that the primary
goal is to accomplish corrective justice: restore the moral balance between
parties and communicate a message about the wrong that was done.27
These traditional objectives—much like economics, behaviorist
psychology, and public choice theories—emphasize the outcomes of tort litigation.
The mass media and the legal literature perpetuate this view that monetary

25

26

27

For a summary of the various objectives of tort law, see JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P.
HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 2–5 (2016). For an analysis of alternative compensation
regimes outside the tort model, see Elizabeth Rolph, Framing the Compensation Inquiry, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2011 (1991).
Under an economic model focused on deterrence, tort liability aims to minimize the combined
cost of accidents and accident prevention by forcing actors to take into account the consequences
of their decisions to act or not to act, through requiring them to pay compensation to injured
victims. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 189–90 (6th ed.
2012); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970);
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); STEVEN SHAVELL, THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Howard A. Latin, Problem Solving Behavior and
Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677 (1985).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. d
(2010) (articulating a rationale for tort liability based on “corrective justice; imposing liability
remedies an injustice done by the defendant to the plaintiff”); see generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort
Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992). This marks a key difference
between deterrence and corrective justice theories: while the former typically does not emphasize
the link between plaintiff and defendant (see Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50
UCLA L. REV. 621, 627–28 (2002) (giving examples of the decoupling of compensation and
liability)), the latter does and argues that restoring the balance entails allocating plaintiffs’ losses to
defendants (see, for example, Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992);
Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88
MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990); Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in
Juror Assessment of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313 (1999)). Yet,
deterrence and corrective justice theorists have in common their emphasis on other goals apart
from compensation itself, in other words, making the plaintiff whole through money damages. See
Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s Demise, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 303,
355–56 (2011) (explaining that one of the reasons for the demise of no-fault compensation was
the rise of deterrence and corrective justice theories—compensation was no longer “king”).
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outcomes drive legal behavior, judgments, and evaluations of the legal system. 28
But a major drawback of this analysis is its tendency to ignore procedural, processrelated considerations.29 Contrary to these outcome-driven theories, I underscore
in this Article objectives derived from the process of tort litigation. As explained
below, I view these as particularly important in asymmetric conflict settings,
where monetary compensation on its own often does not suffice to provide
complete redress for victims. For instance, civil recourse theorists distinguish the
idea of corrective justice, which emphasizes restoring the equilibrium between
injurer and injured, from the notion of tort law as a vehicle for civil recourse:
“In permitting and empowering plaintiffs to act against those who have wronged
them, the state is . . . relying on the principle that plaintiffs who have been
wronged are entitled to some avenue of civil recourse against the
tortfeasor . . . .”30
Additionally, the process of claiming reveals and transmits information
about hazards and injuries.31 Plaintiffs often recite the desire for information
about what happened to them as a reason for filing a lawsuit.32 As Alexandra
Lahav notes, the litigation process can combine the facts and the law to produce
narratives and explanations of past events, frameworks for addressing hurtful
events that are ongoing, and opportunities for healing. Even when these
narratives are not fully satisfactory, they may help participants come to terms

28

See Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-interest, 54.12 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1053 (1999). See also Robert J.
MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L.
SOC. SCI. 171, 181 (2005).

29

MacCoun, supra note 28, at 182. For a review of the extensive social-psychological research on
distributive justice, see Karen A. Hegtvedt & Karen S. Cook, Distributive Justice: Recent Theoretical
Developments and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 93–125 (Joseph Sanders
& Lee Hamilton eds., 2001). See also MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIALPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1985).
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 699 (2003). See also
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998);
Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1777 (2009)
(explaining that the theory seeks to strengthen the explanatory power of corrective justice theory
while retaining its notion that tort law was a matter of private wrongs).

30

31

Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693
(2007) (discussing the information forcing function of tort litigation in the context of product
liability); Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 293 (2018) (discussing similar roles for the tort system in auto accidents).

32

See, for example, Charles Vincent, Magi Young & Angella Phillips, Why Do People Sue Doctors? A
Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Framing the Choice between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund,
42 LAW & SOC. REV. 645 (2008).
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with the past.33 The tort system also provides a forum in which plaintiffs can
have their “day in court,” which is an important part of procedural justice. 34
Moreover, tort litigation provides participants with an official form of
governmental recognition. Even if a party loses her case, the fact that she can
assert her claim and require both a government official and the person who has
wronged her to respond is a significant form of recognition of her dignity and
autonomy.35 The opportunity to stand on equal footing with injurers is of crucial
importance too.36
These goals and benefits,37 apart from being related to process rather than
outcome, are also characterized by a mixture of private and public orientations.
Despite tort law’s traditional focus on relationships between individuals,38 its
roles can be expanded to the public realm, including the enlistment of tort

33

34

35

36

Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1683–84
(2016). For other functions of court-enabled transparency, see Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police
Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (2012); Gillian K. Hadfield & Dan Ryan, Democracy,
Courts and the Information Order, 54 EUR. J. SOC. 67 (2013); Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making
Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001) (arguing
that there are reasons to expect that the imposition of constitutional tort damage awards against
individual officers or their municipal employers has a deterrent effect on governmental actors and
entities).
Tyler, Lind, and their colleagues showed that decision-making procedures, including civil
litigation, not only deliver outcomes; they also convey information about our relationship with the
group and its authorities. Individuals are especially attuned to the procedure’s neutrality, third
parties’ trustworthiness, and signals of social standing, such as having a voice in the process. Tom
R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65–88
(Joseph Sanders & Lee Hamilton eds., 2000); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 230 (1988).
See John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the
Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005). Relatedly, in explaining the key roles of litigation,
including recognition, Lahav relies on Hannah Arendt’s “right to have rights”—the ability to
assert that one is entitled to respect as a moral agent, a foundational form of recognition from the
state. Lahav, supra note 33, at 1668–69.
See Jason M. Solomon, What is Civil Justice, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317 (2010) (relating the civil
recourse aspects of tort law to concepts of democratic equality). In the words of Attorney Rhon
Jones, a lawyer representing claimants eschewing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility following the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill: “There’s only one place where a waitress or a shrimper can be on
equal footing with a company the size of BP, and that’s a courtroom.” Debbie Elliot, BP’s Oil
Slick Set to Spill into Courtroom, NPR, MORNING EDITION (Feb. 16, 2012), http://perma.cc/39GF6LET.

37

For a discussion of these and other benefits of the tort system, including the tort system’s role as
a public space for society to debate how tort obligations should be defined, see Scott Hershovitz,
Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2010); John C. P. Goldberg,
Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003).

38

Goldberg, supra note 37, at 516–20 (discussing the traditional account of tort law that described
tort actions as personal to the victims, and money damages as personal redress to victims).
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litigation towards social change.39 A tort lawsuit, in this sense, can be part of a
broader political campaign, raising awareness of an issue and encouraging
policymakers to deliberate on it.40 This argument applies, perhaps with greater
force, to torts brought against governments, which are the focus of this Article.
Given tort law’s deterrent effect, tort lawsuits can induce a change of practices in
cases where fundamental rights are at stake.41 Imposing liability on the state
through an individual lawsuit may incentivize the state to change its practices to
avoid paying tax revenues as damages to individuals.42 While the issue of
government liability also raises significant practical and theoretical difficulties,43
civil society organizations in the U.S. and elsewhere manage to leverage tort
litigation towards social change struggles.44
39

See, for example, TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (2007)
(arguing, from a normative perspective, for the incorporation of an egalitarian sensitivity into tort
law and private law more generally); Yifat Bitton, Women and Torts: Between Discrimination and
Suspension: Thoughts Following CC (Bet-Shemesh) 41269-02-13 Phillip vs. Abutbul, 41 MIVZAK HE’ARAT
PSIKA 4, 5–10 (2015) (Hebrew) (discussing the benefits, and complexities, of using torts as a
vehicle to achieve social change). As John Goldberg explains, social justice theory conceives of tort as
a device for rectifying imbalance in political power, which corrects for pathologies of interestgroup politics. By arming citizens with the power to sue corporations and other powerful actors
for misconduct outside of the legislative and regulatory process, tort law permits judges and juries
to hold such actors accountable. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 560–62. See also THOMAS H. KOENIG
& MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 9 (2001); Richard L. Abel, Questioning the
Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533 (2000) (arguing that judges
better represent the interests of the people than do legislatures and regulators).

40

PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS
151–52 (1997).

41

For justifications for using torts to promote social justice, see, for example, Gregory C. Keating,
Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193 (2000); Tsachi
Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into the Merits of Redistribution through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness
16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 91 (2003).

42

Bitton, supra note 39, at 7–8 and references there.
Bitton, supra note 39, at 8. Social justice theory has also been criticized, both for its lack of
descriptive power and for treating the political process as systematically skewed against plaintiffs.
See Goldberg, supra note 37, at 562. Moreover, P.S. Atiyah in his critique of English tort law notes
that, though the tort lawsuit is ostensibly conducted between a particular plaintiff and defendant,
in practice the public pays for the damages (through insurance premiums when the defendant is a
private individual or corporation, and through taxes when the defendant is a public body), and
plaintiffs are “in effect jumping the queue” by determining which topics are given political
salience. P.S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 114–16, 171 (1997).
See, for example, Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested
Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38(4) L. & SOC’Y REV. 635 (2004) (arguing that Alien Tort
Claims should be understood as part of broader competing strategies for regulating corporate
obligations); Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1421 (2005) (arguing that
civil rights and torts are powerful allies); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration
from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007) (discussing the use of torts to
combat discrimination and harassment in the workplace). See also Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical

43

44
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I thus argue that given its benefits—in particular, the combination of
monetary compensation on the one hand and process on the other—tort
litigation should have a significant role in promoting government accountability
and victim rehabilitation in asymmetric conflicts. That said, below I highlight the
criticism of torts and apply it to asymmetric conflicts.

B. At the Intersection of Tort Litigation and Asymmetric
Conflict
1. Characteristics of asymmetric conflict and their implications for
civilian compensation
How do the various objectives and benefits of tort law play out in the
context of asymmetric conflict? Are some goals more important in tort claims
brought by victims of such conflicts? As noted, this Article focuses on situations
in which security forces (that is, military or police forces) are operating within
civilian populations to combat non-state actors or otherwise manage a military
occupation. In these conflicts, injuring states perceive their opponents as a
mixture of potential allies and enemy insurgents, and often maintain a visible
presence among civilian populations,45 assuming both military and police-like
roles. Such situations are particularly prone to causing property damage and
bodily harm to uninvolved civilians. These consequences are related, at least in
part, to the difficulty distinguishing combatants and non-combatants in
asymmetric conflict, where insurgents operate from within civilian areas and
where civilians sometimes assume combatant-like roles.46
Another common complexity in these scenarios is the increasingly difficult
distinction between combat and non-combat actions performed by security
forces. This distinction is important since, as explained below, each type of
action prompts a different victim compensation regime. Civilians in asymmetric
conflicts may be injured in a broad range of incidents, which result from either
full-fledged military, quasi-military, or even police-like activities performed by
security forces, including a car accident caused by military vehicles, a (failed or
successful) drone attack, riot control efforts, or a pursuit that does not place
security forces in danger.47 As illustrated below through the two models, the
Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1918–27 (2007) (discussing
limitations of Section 1983 constitutional litigation for money damages).
45

46
47

In Afghanistan, for example, the U.S.’s objectives have been broader than merely military
counterinsurgency and include nation- and state-building and reconstruction. Ronen, supra note
12, at 215–16.
GROSS, supra note 3, at 13.
In the Beni Uda case in Israel, the Court ruled that a pursuit by military forces that does not place
the soldiers in danger was not combat-related. However, the legislators’ dissatisfaction with this
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salience of borderline combat/non-combat scenarios involving civilians
enhances the need for a compensation regime that has objective fact-examining
capabilities and can account for these complexities in asymmetric conflicts. I
argue that a court-based process would do a better job in this respect than a nofault, administrative compensation program.
It should be noted that compensation to individual conflict victims is rare
under the international legal system. First, as Yael Ronen notes, international
tribunals for individual claims are quite limited. The European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights have
narrow mandates, circumscribed by their constitutive documents,48 and it is
unclear whether the laws of an armed conflict can be applied within these
mandates.49 Moreover, while the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute
creates a compensation fund for victims, entitlement depends on individual
responsibility under the Statute, which requires intentional harm, rather than
mere negligence,50 as discussed here.51 Second, under international law the right
to compensation would normally attach to the targeted state, so that any
compensation would belong to the state itself rather than to injured individuals.
As a result, state claims do not guarantee that injured individuals will receive
compensation.52 In this sense, domestic mechanisms remain an important tool

interpretation later led to revising the definition of “Combat Action.” See CA 5964/92 Beni Uda
v. The State of Israel 56(4) PD 1 (2002) (Isr.); Section II.A, supra.
48

These constitutive documents for the European Court of Human Rights include the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5,
http://perma.cc/2SRW-Y9TM, and its protocols. For the Inter-American Commission and
Court of Human Rights, these include the American Convention on Human Rights, art. 33, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; the Charter of the Organization of American
States, art. 106, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; and the Statute of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), 9th Sess., O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80,
Vol. 1 at 88 (1979-1980).

49

See Ronen, supra note 12, at 218.
By which I refer to the common legal definition, in other words, failure to behave with the level
of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same circumstances.
See Negligence, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL LAW
SCHOOL, http://perma.cc/LX8Q-W3EJ.
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, art. 79
(July 17, 1998). It should be noted that the U.N. Compensation Commission offers relief to large
numbers of individual claimants through comparatively simple and expeditious administrative
procedures, which may suggest such a fund can be successful. See John R. Crook, The United
Nations Compensation Commission—A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
144, 145 (1993).

50

51

52

This is particularly risky when it comes to an ethnic minority. Further, claims would not apply to
victims who are not residents of the targeted state. Ronen, supra note 12, at 220.
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for government accountability and victim compensation, especially when it
comes to democratic, law-abiding states involved in asymmetric conflicts.

2. Benefits of tort litigation in asymmetric conflict
Domestic civil litigation has emerged as a prominent means for the
promotion of international human rights norms,53 particularly in countries such
as the U.S.54 Though human rights abuses represent more extreme misconducts
than those addressed in this Article, as they typically involve intentional rather
than merely negligent or otherwise wrongful acts, this analogy sheds light on the
issue before us. In particular, scholars have studied the benefits of tort litigation
for addressing human rights violations conducted against the backdrop of
internal or external conflict. Beth Van Schaack and Beth Stephens have both
noted the potential of tort litigation to restore and promote a sense of agency—
the impression that we exercise some control over the processes and events that
affect us—especially when that sense was destroyed by the conduct that is the
subject of the suit.55 Since such abuses often involve denial of dignity, liberty,
choice, and autonomy, the mere act of re-conceptualizing oneself as a holder of
rights can offer a sense of empowerment.56 It can provide victims with an
“exercise in self-determination,” inverting the victim/perpetrator status.57
In addition, as noted, tort litigation provides victims with access to a
narrative forum58 that enables them to name their experience and situate it
53

54

55

56

57

58

See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (2008) (arguing
for the relevance of tort law in fighting against human rights abuses); JASON N. E. VARUHAS,
DAMAGES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2016) (exploring the principles governing and the theoretical
foundations of damage awards for breaches of human rights).
See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic
Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2002) (discussing reasons
for prominence of human rights civil litigation in the U.S.); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large
Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 165 (2001) (noting various ways
in which tort law has been used to compensate victims of human rights abuses in the U.S.).
See Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social
Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2318 (2004) (discussing the “profound impact” civil cases in U.S.
courts can have on victims of human rights violations and their communities); Stephens, supra
note 54, at 45, 52 (noting plaintiffs’ general control over tort litigation as opposed to criminal
prosecutions, with some exceptions).
Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 661–62 (1987); see also Jan Gorecki, Human Rights: Explaining the
Power of a Moral and Legal Idea, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 153, 154–55 (1987) (conceptualizing the driving
power of rights).
Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice
Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 50 (2004).
Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 356
(1996) (“Narrative provides a link between the daily reality of violence in which law traffics and
the normative ideal—justice—to which law aspires.”).
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within a larger policy or practice.59 Tort rhetoric invites the attribution of legal
responsibility and moral blameworthiness, thus contributing to the alleviation of
victims’ feelings of guilt. These discursive processes of “naming, blaming, and
claiming”60 are important features of civil litigation, as compared with criminal
prosecutions.61
These processes are especially crucial where the responsible government
has denied a remedy. Indeed, the effectiveness of criminal remedies depends
upon state discretion, and the government with criminal jurisdiction over the
offender may be unwilling to prosecute for evidentiary or political reasons. 62
Further, even when criminal prosecutions are brought, civil suits provide an
effective complement to such proceedings as they “offer victims of violence a
legal remedy which they control and which may satisfy needs not met by the
criminal law system.”63 Unlike criminal proceedings, civil cases also involve the
victim directly participating in the legal process. The victim chooses to initiate
the proceeding and then plays a central role throughout, which can be
empowering and restore a sense of justice.64 In comparison to a criminal suit, a
civil suit may better preserve a collective memory and “permit a more thorough
airing of victims’ stories . . . along with an expression of judicial solicitude.”65 In
this regard, a criminal proceeding is focused on the culpability of the perpetrator
at the expense of the harm suffered by the victim, which is key to the civil
process.66 In my view, this makes the civil proceeding not only a second-tier
complement, or replacement when criminal remedies are unavailable, but rather
a meaningful option in its own right.
59

Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse
Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 549, 628 (1996) (discussing the creation of a self-authored life
story through litigation); David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2152, 2152–62 (1989) (identifying local and political narratives and the “confluence” of the
two in a legal judgment).

60

William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming,
15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631 (1980).

61

Stephens, supra note 54, at 18–21 (comparing criminal and civil procedures in human rights
litigation); Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 141, 156–59, 195
(2001) (noting different roles of victims in civil and criminal processes).

62

Van Schaack, supra note 61, at 156.
Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60
ALB. L. REV. 579, 581 (1997).
Van Schaack, supra note 61, at 156.

63

64
65

Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2101 (1998)
(noting the psychological benefits of civil suits to victims).

66

However, tort law, even in its corrective form, may be limited in providing victims with a sense of
retribution, which, as observed below, is key to some victims’ motivations.
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Furthermore, being accorded fair procedures before a neutral and
respectful decision-maker may provide a surrogate for apology and repentance
from responsible parties.67 The very process of a court determining the validity
of a claim forces an examination of the historical record,68 even if the outcome is
ultimately not successful.69 Where it is successful, tort litigation also offers the
promise of a reordering of one’s worldview of good and evil that ascribes new
meaning to a traumatic experience. Thus, litigation can generate a form of
collective memory, particularly in the face of counternarratives that would deny
violations or portray victims as blameworthy.70 Finally, in most personal injury
suits, the enforcement of the applicable legal right is achieved through a money
judgment quantifying the harm. A damage award as a medium of social meaning
marks a “spiritual victory,”71 recognizes concrete damage to individuals, and is
symbolic of a plaintiff’s loss. Where an award can be enforced, money damages
provide economic support to enable rehabilitation and reintegration into society
and confer social standing on plaintiffs.
Violent asymmetric conflicts—particularly those marked by a racial, ethnic,
or religious divide—bear similarities to the situations discussed above from both
the victims’ and the perpetrators’ perspectives. They are often characterized by
chaotic situations, commonly leaving victims with lack of information about
what happened to them or their loved ones. Such conflicts sometimes involve
concerns and frustrations resulting from grievances that transcend the specific

67

Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 381 (2003).

68

Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 323, 383 (1987). In the slavery reparations case, for example, plaintiffs sought to compel the
production of relevant documents to create an accurate historical record of economic
relationships underlying the institution of slavery. In re African-American Slave Descendants’
Litig., MDL No. 1491, Lead Case No. 02 C 7764, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 872, at *30–31 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 26, 2004) (discussing accounting cause of action); In re African-American Slave Descendants’
Litig., MDL No. 1491, Lead Case No. 02 C 7764, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12016, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
July 14, 2003).

69

See generally JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG
ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003) (discussing the impact of failed cases on processes of social
change). This judicial record can then enhance and further focus the fact finding and reporting
efforts of human rights documentation groups. Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights
Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 197 (2002) (“The often
thorough and well-documented human rights reporting that is occurring today will finally have a
specific context for assisting in the enforcement of human rights norms.”).
Sarat, supra note 58, at 366 (“[T]he litigated case can be used to create a record, and the court can
become the archive in which that record services as the materialization of memory.”); MARK
OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 209–39 (1997) (discussing the role
of law—particularly of trials involving state abuses—in forging collective memory).
LOBEL, supra note 69, at 8.

70

71

390

Vol. 19 No. 2

Collateral Damages

Bachar

dispute at hand. In this sense, though victims’ claims are individual, they are part
of a larger dispute—that is, the conflict itself. Resolving the dispute may thus
require responding to such underlying concerns, similar in some ways to a class
action.72
Thus, while some of the benefits of the tort system do not apply to
asymmetric conflict settings more generally as they do to human rights abuses,
many of them do. For instance, the opportunity to receive information about the
events that transpired and stand on equal footing and confront a much more
powerful adversary,73 are key in both. In addition, the need for official
recognition, through an apology or money damages, may well apply to civilians
injured by another country’s security forces, particularly against the backdrop of
deep political, ethnic, or religious divides.74 In this sense, I argue, the tort system
provides three key benefits in asymmetric conflict settings, flowing from both its
outcome and process: compensation (outcome), victim participation (process),
and government accountability (process). However, as discussed below, these
situations are also prone to the same problems tort systems typically raise.

3. Flaws of tort litigation in asymmetric conflict
For all their benefits, tort systems also suffer from many flaws, which may
make the process of bringing a civil lawsuit particularly frustrating and
unsatisfying for conflict victims, and difficult to navigate from the injuring
state’s perspective. Lawsuits tend to drag on for years, during which victims do
not receive any form of remedy for their injuries.75 Litigation is costly, too.76
Beth Van Schaack describes the difficulties plaintiffs face:

72

See Van Schaack, supra note 55, at 2323–24 (“while individual suits involve the allegations of only
the named plaintiffs, such suits often manifest a representational quality and as such are capable
of accommodating a more contextual and comprehensive consideration of repression beyond that
suffered by the body and to that suffered by the body politic.”) However, oftentimes claims are
not sufficiently similar in their fact patterns to justify consolidating them into an actual class
action. On the Israeli case, see Section III.A, supra.

73

As Jason Solomon puts it, this is not an aspiration for an “eye for an eye”-style justice, but rather
“eye to eye justice.” Solomon, supra note 30, at 1822.

74

For an account of the complex relationship between conflict (be it ethnic, religious or political)
and dispute (usually legal) resolution, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Historical Contingencies of
Conflict Resolution, 1 INT’L J. CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT & RESOL. 32, 37 (2013).
For critiques regarding the slow pace, unpredictability, and other aspects of the tort system, see
THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn
Persistence of Tort, 6 J. TORT L. 75 (2013); STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL
INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 38, 40
(1989); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 126–55
(2001).

75
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Parties to a civil suit are constrained by [the imposed order of] procedural
and evidentiary rules77 . . . and plaintiffs may find conforming their
testimony to justiciable legal claims and admissibility rules to be limiting . . .
and alienating. In particular, plaintiffs may not be allowed to reenact their
whole story or emphasize aspects that are important to them but
“irrelevant” from the perspective of the legal process.78

In addition, litigation may also retraumatize victims, especially considering
power differences between plaintiffs and defendants that are common in
asymmetric conflicts.79 Since litigation is inherently adversarial, defendants are
entitled to defend against the accusations leveled at them. In practice,
defendants’ line of defense may involve attempts to discount a plaintiff’s
account through rigorous cross-examination and the presentation of contrary or
impeaching evidence.80 Where conflict victims do not relate the memories of
their experiences in a consistent sequential manner, a defendant’s aggressive
cross-examination on credibility and accuracy can do real damage.81 As Jamie
O’Connell explains, “‘[l]ots of survivors compartmentalize the issues and
retrieve the memories in disjointed fashion to protect themselves from being
overwhelmed by the whole memory’ of their trauma. For them, explaining
meticulously what happened would require putting these pieces together and
could bring the whole memory flooding back.”82
76

Litigation is particularly costly when it comes to negligence. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 181 (7th ed. 2007). There are indications that trials are very costly and that this
cost sometimes outweighs the likely return. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 517–18
(2004). However, studies of discovery costs (based on lawyer surveys) indicate that these costs—
often thought to be very high—are generally proportional to the value of the case. EMERY G. LEE
III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY:
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
28, 43 (2009).

77

For instance, the prohibition on presenting evidence regarding the defendant’s actions beyond
those contained in the lawsuit, which is considered prejudicial, even though it may seem quite
relevant to the victim/plaintiff.
Van Schaack, supra note 55, at 2320.

78
79

See Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console their
Victims? 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 295, 323–26, 331–32 (2005) (noting the potential for a legal
proceeding—both civil and criminal—to adversely affect victims by resurrecting psychological
difficulties that they were already able to set aside).

80

See Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463,
540 (1995) (noting the potential in the human rights context for “the experience of public
testimony . . . [to be] personally degrading rather than empowering.”).
See generally Jane Herlihy et al., Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories—Implications for the Assessment
of Asylum Seekers: Repeated Interviews Study, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 324, 324 (2002) (presenting research
showing that discrepancies in accounts by victims of extreme trauma is not necessarily indicative
of a lack of credibility).
See O’Connell, supra note 79, at 333 (citing an interview with clinical psychologist Mary Fabri).

81

82
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Furthermore, the plaintiff must be prepared to lose her case, regardless of
the harm suffered, which can create deep anxiety over the course of the suit and
upon the announcement of a negative verdict.83 Although some measure of
anonymity may be available, civil litigation also forces plaintiffs into the public
eye, which can render them and their loved ones vulnerable to social sanctions. 84
Such ramifications may occur within plaintiffs’ own community, as suing for
money damages could be considered legitimizing foreign involvement.85 Another
key issue is settlements reached in the shadow of the tort system, which, as
discussed below, was common under the Israeli compensation regime during the
1990s.86 Out-of-court settlements are a prevalent feature of civil litigation,87
which presents a barrier to leveraging tort lawsuits towards public goals. As
Ellen Berrey and her colleagues note regarding labor cases, secret settlements
under the adversarial system often prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights
and from experiencing litigation as a tool to restore their dignity.88 Furthermore,
as indicated by the term “asymmetric,” these conflicts entail an inherent power
imbalance between the parties—military forces facing individual, often

83

See Van Schaack, supra note 55, at 2321 for examples.

84

In the Israeli-Palestinian context, one plaintiffs’ lawyer noted a tragic case in which a Palestinian
plaintiff who won a case was later murdered, presumably by relatives who were after her money.
Interview with PL17(Feb. 2016). See also Van Schaack, supra note 55.
This concern has been voiced in the Israeli-Palestinian context. See George E. Bisharat, Courting
Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering under Israeli Occupation, 20 LAW & SOC. INQ. 349, 364 n.64 (1995)
(noting lawyers’ concern that joining the Israeli bar would acknowledge the permanency, if not
the legitimacy, of Israeli occupation).
See Section III.A., supra.

85

86
87

On the prevalence of settlements in tort litigation, and the challenges they present, see Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1339 (1994) (questioning the assertion that settlements are better than trial); Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011) (arguing that while highvolume personal injury firms are accomplishing many of the goals of no-fault mechanisms, they
do so out of the light of day, which creates ethical issues); Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to
Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162–64 (1986) (analyzing 1649 cases in five
federal judicial districts and seven state courts and examining how they were resolved).

88

ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 265 (2017). Relatedly, when discussing the U.S. Army’s compensation
mechanism for injured civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, John Witt notes the use of “grids and
tables that provide guidance on the way to resolve the kinds of cases that recur again and again.”
John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 41 LOY. L.A. L REV.
1455, 1477 (2008). This analogy speaks to the similarities between a no-fault and a tort-based
mechanism that relies heavily on out-of-court settlements. This issue is further discussed in
Section IV, supra.
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disempowered plaintiffs—which, some argue, compromise the deterrent effect
of torts in government-related contexts.89
Finally, a common argument against the use of tort law in conflict settings
is that the tort system is ill-equipped to handle the unique set of risks involved in
combat.90 Critics contend that the risks in times of war are greater in scope and
more diverse in kind than in times of peace, and that there are significant
difficulties obtaining evidence in cases concerning war damage.91 Tort law also
envisages a dispute between two individuals, while military activity typically
generates mass claims, and involves governmental policy and budgetary
considerations that are difficult to adjudicate.92 As John Witt notes, from the
state’s perspective, there is an inherent difficulty to reconciling the goals of tort
law with strategic war goals.93 However, the combat exclusion, included in many
countries’ tort legislation, may be sufficient to adapt the law of torts to conflict
situations and release the state from liability only for those claims arising from
full-fledged warfare, as opposed to a variety of other incidents that occur in lowintensity, simmering asymmetric conflicts.94 In other words, I argue that the
diverse incidents that can cause civilian injury in asymmetric conflicts, such as
car accidents, checkpoint abuses, and use of riot control techniques, do not
justify a blanket denial of liability for all conflict-related situations.

89

90

91

92
93
94

See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284–86 (1988) (discussing the
inadequacy of tort remedies in the context of constitutional violations by law enforcement
officials).
See, for example, the view expressed by Chief Justice Aharon Barak in HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v.
Government of Israel 62(1) PD 1 (2006) (Isr.), and Justice Amit in CA 1459/11 The Estate of
Hardan v. The State of Israel—Ministry of Defense (2013) (Isr.). See also Atif Rehman, Note, The
Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the Alien Tort Claims Act,
16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 493, 517–18 (2006) (arguing that tort law is an inappropriate tool
for dealing with damage caused by military activity).
See the respondent’s arguments in Adalah, supra note 90. Further, since military activity is routinely
hazardous, the presumption of ultra-hazardous activity is inapplicable, as are other evidentiary
rules of tort law. Ronen, supra note 12, at 219. In this context, a case that merits mentioning is
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In this World War II case, the U.S. Supreme Court
expressed deep skepticism about allowing claims against military officials during wartime because
the Court was concerned that such claims would interfere with the military’s ability to conduct the
war effectively. The case was later cited in many of the “war on terror” cases that were litigated in
the U.S. between 2002 and 2008.
Ronen, supra note 12, at 220.
Witt, supra note 88, at 1467.
See the Court’s opinion in Adalah, supra note 90, at ¶ 41.
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C. No-Fault as an Alternative
That said, these disadvantages of the tort system may suggest that a more
streamlined process, such as a claim facility or compensation fund, are better
suited for this setting.95 A “no-fault” mechanism, which does not require
showing fault or negligence on the part of security forces involved, promises to
be less costly and much faster than tort litigation.96 A no-fault system would
potentially reduce variability between tort lawsuits, promoting horizontal equality
and eliminating windfall awards and the combative, adversarial nature of the tort
system.97 However, such a no-fault system typically would not provide
information to claimants, nor would it allow them to have their “day in court” or
experience empowerment through the legal process. It thus gives precedence to
efficiency and economy over values such as participation, accountability, and
transparency.98 Arguably, military considerations may need to circumscribe the
latter values.99 But is this trade-off worthwhile?
While studies of victim compensation regimes in other contexts often
focus on monetary interests as the main objectives for victims,100 multiple other
95

96

97
98

99

100

As discussed below, such payments are considered “ex gratia” (out of kindness) as there is no
proof of liability. Marian Nash Leich, Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian
Basis, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 319, 319–24 (1989); Harold G. Maier, Ex Gratia Payments and the Iranian
Airline Tragedy, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 325, 325–32 (1989) (discussing compensation offered by states
for mistakenly targeting civilians).
See Rolph, supra note 25. However, such programs often do not deliver. See, for example, critique
offered by Freeman Engstrom, supra note 87.
See generally critiques on the tort system, supra note 75.
Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass
Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819 (2011). However, at times, such mechanisms do
allow victim participation through meetings with the Special Master. In the 9/11 case, victims
were given this opportunity, which many seized. Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master of the 9/11
Victim Compensation Fund (VCF), apparently met with nearly 1000 families. Robert M.
Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to
National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135 (2005). Victim participation can also be achieved
through a town-hall format, as done in the Gulf Coast Claims Facility for the BP oil spill. See
Mullenix, supra note 98.
However, according to Nora Freeman Engstrom, the promises of no-fault mechanisms often go
unfulfilled, as was the case with the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) and auto nofault regimes in the U.S. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons
from the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2015); Engstrom, supra note 27.
This was a common approach towards the VCF for those who were injured or lost a family
member in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Following the 9/11 tragedy, victims were
faced with a choice between cash payment available through VCF and the (limited) pursuit of tort
litigation. Viewing this choice in the expected value terms that are standard in legal scholarship
and the economic analysis of litigation (see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989), and Section II.A., supra),
Feinberg saw it as “a classic trade-off between administrative speed and efficiency and rolling the
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incentives drive victims. Conflict-related wrongs, in particular, often involve not
just wrongful injury to material worth—harm that can be relatively easily
quantified by a no-fault mechanism—but also injuries deserving of nonmonetary
responses, such as acknowledgment and apology.101 Furthermore, legal nonprofits representing victims may wish to instrumentally use tort litigation to
expose wrongs on a political—rather than only personal—level. A no-fault
mechanism, especially when it fails to include other process-related features
offered by the tort system, would not support such needs.102

101

102

dice in court and going for the proverbial pot of gold.” Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow,
Victims’ Fund Likely to Pay Average of $1.6 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, cited in Hadfield,
supra note 32, at 646. See also KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005) (discussing his
experiences as Special Master). Similarly, a study conducted by the RAND Institute assessed the
extent to which the amounts calculated by VCF accurately captured the dollar value of the losses
associated with injury or death. LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, RAND INSTITUTE
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS (2004). Other studies
have also focused on the amounts awarded by VCF as the criterion for assessing its fairness or
success as an alternative to tort litigation. See, for example, Martha Chamallas, The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51 (2003);
Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Response or an
Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003); Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and
Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2003). One exception in this context is
Deborah Hensler’s work, which discusses the non-monetary goals plaintiffs might have had in the
context of VCF, including accountability. Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice
through Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 427 (2003).
See Van Schaack, supra note 55, at 2322–23; Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 67, at 361, 367–68
(noting the rejection of compensation for moral wrongs); Hensler, supra note 100, at 432–37
(discussing the relationship between harm and money for 9/11 victims). Of course, plaintiffs may
resent the “commodification” of their experience when forced to quantify the harm caused to
them or their loved ones, which is necessary in tort litigation too. See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 445 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (noting that
tort damages perpetuate the fiction that money is equivalent to harm, equate money with human
dignity and integrity, and assume that for every pain suffered, there will be an amount that will
compensate).
Gillian Hadfield’s work on VCF empirically supports this argument. From surveys of and
interviews with claimants who chose to litigate following injuries caused by the 9/11 attacks, who
constituted only 3% of claimants, several interesting findings arise. First, in listing the reasons that
led them to litigate, respondents did not mention the potential for obtaining a higher payout.
Instead, they recited considerations such as punishing those responsible, wanting to find out more
about what happened, and a desire to promote change and prevent similar events from
reoccurring. Hadfield, supra note 32, at 661–62. Furthermore, litigating respondents perceived the
money from VCF as “hush money.” Id. at 661. The reasons to file with VCF emerged as
capitulation to immediate financial need; capitulation to age (in other words, litigation would take
years); being skeptical of litigation’s ability to achieve its desired goals—especially given the caps
and limits Congress had imposed; and difficulties obtaining legal representation. Id. at 666–69.
Hadfield’s findings imply, then, that claimants were interested in accountability and information,
yet most were forced to succumb to more mundane considerations. In this view, civil litigation
serves a variety of functions for plaintiffs that exceeds its capacity to offer compensation. Of
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Lastly, when considering the alternative of no-fault vis-à-vis tort litigation
in asymmetric conflicts, it is important to examine the potential impact on
defendants. Indeed, a trial provides the ultimate vehicle for individual
accountability.103 Individual defendants’ lives are disrupted while they are forced
to either defend their actions, often at a considerable cost, or accept a default
judgment.104 Moreover, a plaintiff’s verdict in the civil context assigns legal and
moral responsibility, even where the judgment remains unexecuted.105 In
addition, as mentioned, tort litigation can have broader effects. It requires
defendants to expose evidence, answer questionnaires, and often testify in open
court, which carries positive externalities in the sense of “[s]unlight is . . . the
best of disinfectants.”106 When it comes to institutional defendants such as
security forces, discovery and evidentiary requirements may push for greater
accountability than payments provided on a no-fault basis and encourage change
of practices on the part of units that are repeatedly implicated.107
With this in mind, I now turn to examining two examples representing
different types of asymmetric conflicts, with injuring states choosing to handle
compensation to civilians in two different ways: Israel’s tort-based mechanism
for compensating Palestinian civilians injured as a result of Israel’s actions in the
Territories, and the U.S.’s FCA and condolence payments, used to compensate
local civilians for losses suffered by U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

III. C IVILIAN C OMPENSATION IN A SYMMETRIC C ONFLICT BY
I SRAEL AND THE U.S.
A. Israel-Palestine
On January 16, 2007, in Anata, a Palestinian village north of Jerusalem,
Abir Aramin, a 10-year-old Palestinian girl, was walking home from school. She

103

104

105

course, the 9/11 case differs significantly from the context of protracted, asymmetric conflict,
representing different power relations between victims and government. However, it is illustrative
of victims’ needs and motivations following a traumatic event.
See Jonathan A. Bush, Book Review Essay: Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 2022, 2066 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)).
In this context, it is important to bear in mind that a key motivation for VCF was the desire to
protect airlines from going bankrupt. See Mullenix, supra note 98. This may differ when suing a
state.
See Van Schaack, supra note 55, at 2330–31.

106

As famously put by Justice Brandeis in LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW
THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1913).

107

See Schwartz, supra note 33 (discussing information gathered by police departments through civil
proceedings and how it is used in performance-improvement efforts).
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was then fatally wounded by a dull object, allegedly a rubber bullet shot by
Israeli soldiers controlling a volatile protest in her village. While Israeli
authorities decided not to bring criminal charges against the soldiers involved,
Abir’s parents filed a civil lawsuit against the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The
Jerusalem District Court awarded the family $430,000 in damages for their
daughter’s wrongful death.108
Abir’s family utilized a unique mechanism that enables non-Israeli citizen
Palestinians to bring civil actions for damages against the State of Israel before
Israeli civil courts, for property damage, bodily injury, or wrongful death
resulting from the actions of security forces109 in the Territories (the Claims).110
Claims are brought for incidents ranging from the use of riot control techniques
during protest, to military counterinsurgency actions, checkpoint shootings,
drone attacks, and full-fledged military operations.111 Indeed, the Claims are part
of a broader Israeli policy originating in 1967 to allow Palestinians to petition
Israel’s courts to challenge actions of the military regime.112 As such, the Israeli
case presents a rare exception to typical bars on bringing claims against the
injuring state in the context of armed conflicts,113 including in the U.S.114 As for
108

109

110

111

112

113

Harriet Sherwood, Israel to Pay Family Compensation over Killing of Palestinian Girl, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://perma.cc/KD43-ZFAY.
Israel’s security forces include the Israeli military (IDF), police forces (typically Border Police Unit
(BPU)), and the General Security Service. MOD data cited below refer only to IDF incidents
(including BPU), while the other authorities do not maintain independent records regarding tort
lawsuits by Palestinians.
Importantly, Israel has a different relationship with the West Bank and Gaza. While in the former
Israel still controls, to various degrees, both civil and security matters, in the latter, since 2005,
Israeli involvement has significantly diminished. See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2d ed. 2012).
Such as Operation Cast Lead—also known as the Gaza War—a three-week armed conflict
between Gaza Palestinians and Israel during 2008–09.
Thus, bars of jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing do not apply to the Claims. Michael
Karayanni, Choice of Law under Occupation: How Israeli Law Came to Serve Palestinian Plaintiffs, 5 J. PRIV.
INT’L L. 1 (2009). For the history of this policy, see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF
JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 19–25 (2002).
Ronen, supra note 12, at 217 (noting that an individual lawsuit mechanism—like Israel's—is rare
in armed conflict settings). This exception stems, among other reasons, from the special status of
the Territories as occupied and the lack of alternative recourse to Palestinians’ home forum.
According to international law, Israeli control in the Territories is defined as a ‘military
occupation’ and treated as temporary until a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will allow a
withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces. Consequently, Israeli activity in the Territories is constantly
criticized by the international community. For more on the Territories’ status, see BENVENISTI,
supra note 110. Importantly, Palestinians are barred from bringing claims against Israel before
Palestinian courts. MICHAEL KARAYANNI, CONFLICTS IN A CONFLICT: A CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE
STUDY ON ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 239 (2014) (discussing Palestinians’ lack of
access to justice).
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suing the State in torts, according to the Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law
(the Act), Israel is not immune to civil liability.115 However, the State is not liable
for an act performed through Combat Action,116 an exclusion that has been
significantly expanded over the past fifteen years.117
The Claims have several key characteristics. They represent individual
cases—rather than a class action—and are based on injuries that resulted from
different circumstances, much like typical personal injury lawsuits.118 The
common cause of action is negligence, though Claims can also be brought for
violation of statutory duty or assault. Claims are litigated at first instance in
either magistrate or district courts, depending on the plaintiffs’ estimate of their
damages.119 Only few make it to the Supreme Court on appeal,120 and they are
rarely covered by the media.121 Damage awards range from approximately $1,000
in the smallest, property-related cases, to approximately $500,000 in the largest,
personal injury cases.122 Finally, prior to the Second Intifada—a violent
Palestinian-Israeli confrontation that started in September 2000—most
114

See note 139.

115

It should be noted that alongside the civil proceeding, IDF sometimes opens a criminal
investigation when a suspicion arises for soldier misconduct. Such investigations rarely result in an
indictment. See YESH DIN, ALLEGED INVESTIGATION: THE FAILURE OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO
OFFENSES COMMITTED BY IDF SOLDIERS AGAINST PALESTINIANS (2011), http://perma.cc/8JE9YVY5; YESH DIN, EXCEPTIONS: TRYING IDF SOLDIERS SINCE THE SECOND INTIFADA AND AFTER,
2000-2007 (2008), http://perma.cc/R9NU-UL3D.

116

Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law, 5712-1952, § 2, 5 (as amended) (Isr.),
http://perma.cc/2LPU-9NZ8.

117

Gilat J. Bachar, The Occupation of the Law: Judiciary-Legislature Power Dynamics in Palestinians’ Tort
Claims against Israel, 38 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 577 (2017) (finding, through a quantitative and qualitative
content analysis, significant changes in the State of Israel’s liability following a legislative change
expanding the combat exclusion).

118

Furthermore, when the fact patterns for a large group of cases are sufficiently similar to justify
consolidating them into a class action, the cases are likely to fall under the combat exclusion
discussed below.
The current threshold for bringing a case before district courts is 2,500,000NIS (~$670,000;
exchange rate date Dec. 6, 2018).
Alongside its role as a High Court of Justice, the Israeli Supreme Court considers cases on appeal
on decisions made by district courts. Decisions in Claims that were first litigated in magistrate
courts are appealed before the district court. The Court rarely grants a right to appeal, for the
second time, a magistrate court decision. Courts Law (Consolidated Text) 5744-1984.
Interview with NGOL9 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with author). High-profile cases are typically
those related to foreign nationals, and the attention given to those cases often prompts the State
to settle them. Interview with GL8, MOD (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author); Interview with
PL9 (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author); Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan. 2016) (notes on file
with author).

119

120

121

122

Data are based on a content analysis I conducted of court decisions in the Claims towards a
previous paper. See Bachar, The Occupation of the Law, supra note 117.
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successful Claims ended with an out-of-court settlement.123 The tendency to
settle Claims during those years is related to evidentiary challenges that both
plaintiffs and the State face in the Claims,124 but also to the State’s desire to
prevent public embarrassment by keeping incidents of security forces’
misconduct under a veil of confidentiality.125
Beginning in the Second Intifada,126 though, the regime governing the
Claims changed dramatically. While between 1992 and 2002 Palestinian plaintiffs
were successful in 39 percent of the Claims adjudicated by the courts, between
2002 and 2012 they prevailed in only 17 percent.127 This figure dropped further
over the last several years.128 This change resulted from two main developments.
First, the combat exclusion was expanded by the Israeli legislature.129 Second,
123

124

125

126

127

Report in Response to MOD FOIA Query, Nov. 13, 2016 (on file with author). According to
plaintiffs’ lawyers, settlements accounted for 99 percent of their successful Claims. Interview with
PL2 (Sept. 2014) (notes on file with author); Data regarding cases represented by PL2’s firm in
the Claims, March 2015 (on file with author). One rare exception was PL14, who noted that most
of his cases ended with a court decision. Interview with PL14 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with
author).
For instance, Palestinians typically do not maintain records of their property, rendering property
damage caused by Israeli soldiers difficult to prove. Interview with PL4 (Mar. 2015) (notes on file
with author); Interview with PL2 (Sept. 2014) (notes on file with author); Second interview with
PL7 (Aug. 2014) (notes on file with author). Changes in the nature of the Conflict, from a popular
uprising during the First Intifada, to a full-fledged armed conflict in the Second Intifada,
exacerbated these challenges, given the use of fire arms by both sides. Interview with PL2 (Sept.
2014) (notes on file with author); Interview with PL3 (Jul. 2015) (notes on file with author).
Interview with PL1 (Jul. 2014) (notes on file with author) (noting that 95% of his cases ended
with a settlement, as it is cheaper, saves time, safer, and prevents public embarrassment);
Interview with GL5, DA (Aug. 2015) (notes on file with author) (mentioning the State’s tendency
to settle cases during the First Intifada era—70% of the Claims according to her estimate were
settled—which stemmed, among other things, from a desire to protect national security).
Since the outburst of the Second Intifada, the Conflict had generally been on a path of
deterioration, with attacks from, and casualties on, both sides. See Michele K. Esposito, The alAqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years, 34(2)
J. PALESTINE STUD. 85 (2005) (giving a detailed account of the events of the Second Intifada);
Johannes Haushofer et. al., Both Sides Retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 107(42) PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 17927 (2010) (analyzing the Conflict’s escalation as a result of mutual retaliation).
Bachar, supra note 117.

128

FOIA Reports, supra note 123; STEIN, B’TSELEM, supra note 7, at 48 (showing that in recent years
there are fewer Claims filed and less compensation paid to Palestinians by Israel).

129

Until 2002, the Act did not include a definition of ‘Combat Action,’ for which the State is exempt
from liability. The Israeli legislature (Knesset) had discussed adding a definition for over a decade,
but failed to legislate, leaving it to courts to interpret the term. See HAMOKED: CTR. FOR THE DEF.
OF THE INDIVIDUAL, Activity Reports for the Years 2005, 2006, http://perma.cc/CT9U-WW6T.
(On the legal regime under the previous version of the Act, see Assaf Jacob, Immunity under Fire:
State Immunity for Damage Caused by Combat Action, 33 MISHPATIM L. REV. 107 (2003) (Hebrew);
Bachar, supra note 117). Yet, the Knesset was unhappy with the interpretation given to ‘Combat
Action’ by the courts. See Protocols of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of
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following a failed attempt to replace the Claims’ mechanism with a blanket
immunity to the state for actions undertaken on its behalf in what is defined,
even retroactively, as a “conflict zone,” which was struck down by the High
Court of Justice,130 the state introduced numerous procedural requirements that
limit Palestinians’ access to Israeli civil courts.131 As a result of these
developments, it is currently almost impossible for Palestinians to successfully
seek redress for injuries caused by Israeli security forces in the Territories
through the courts. Two alternatives to the court-based mechanism set forth by
the Act remain.132 First, claimants can submit an application for compensation to
a committee comprising three Ministry of Defense (MOD) employees (the Ex
12/25/2001, 6/24/2002, 6/26/2002 (Hebrew). Consequently, after the Second Intifada erupted
in 2000, resulting in massive harm to Palestinians and a high volume of Claims, Amendment (no.
4) was enacted. Under the Amendment, the Israeli legislature added a broad definition of ‘Combat
Action,’ “including any action conducted to combat terrorism . . . and any action whose stated
aim is to prevent terrorism, hostile actions, or insurrection committed in circumstances of danger
to life or limb.” Pursuant to this Amendment, then, the pool of events considered combatrelated—and thus exempt from liability—increased significantly. See Bachar, supra note 117, at
585–86.
130

This change was enacted in Amendment (no. 7) (the 2005 Amendment). According to the 2005
Amendment’s supporters, since both sides are in the midst of an armed conflict, each party
should be responsible for its own damages. See Protocol of the Knesset's Constitution, Law, and
Justice Committee of 6/30/2005 (Hebrew). Rather than the financial burden the Claims imposed,
the motivation for the Amendment was the sense that Israel is engaged in an armed conflict with
the Palestinians, a context with which tort law is incompatible. Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan.
2016) (notes on file with author). See also Interview with GL9, IDF (Dec. 2016) (notes on file with
author) (noting the IDF “checked what is happening in other countries and we saw that in many
countries the road [for suing] is blocked . . . so we said why not block it too?”); Interview with
GL12, MOJ (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview with GL5, DA (Aug. 2015) (notes
on file with author). However, the High Court of Justice (HCJ) declared the 2005 Amendment
unconstitutional for violating Palestinians’ constitutional right to property. While the HCJ
acknowledged that tort law “is not suited to dealing with damage caused in a time of war,” it did
not accept the exemption that the State sought for combat and non-combat activities in the
Territories, holding that “case by case examination should not be replaced by a sweeping
exemption from liability.” Adalah, supra note 90, at 379, 383.

131

The policy that ensued from the HCJ’s decision essentially recreated the 2005 Amendment by
using procedural obstacles, including shortening the limitations period on Claims and requiring
the deposit of bonds as a pre-condition for litigation. For a detailed account of these procedural
requirements, see Bachar, Access Denied, supra note 23 (describing the barriers Palestinians face in
bringing claims against the Israeli government). As of 2014, Gaza residents are no longer eligible
to bring Claims, as Gaza was declared “enemy territory.” Civil Tort Ordinance (Liability of the
State) (Declaration of Enemy Territory–the Gaza Strip), 7431-2014 (Isr.). Passed in October
2014, the Ordinance applies retroactively, starting in July 2014. This Ordinance has been
challenged in a lawsuit brought in the case of Nabahin (CC (Be'er-Sheva) 45043-05-16). As of this
writing, the District Court has not ruled on it.

132

These apply to Palestinian victims of Israeli military actions. When it comes to Israeli victims of
terrorism, compensation is provided through the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law [24
L.S.I. 131 (1970)] for bodily injuries and families of deceased victims, and through the Property
Tax and Compensation Fund Law [15 L.S.I. 101 (1961)] for property damage.
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Gratia Committee). The Ex Gratia Committee has discretion to recommend
awarding small amounts of compensation to Palestinians and foreign nationals
injured by Israeli security forces,133 either based on independent appeals to the
Ex Gratia Committee or following a court’s recommendation.134 The cases under
the Ex Gratia Committee’s mandate are defined as “irregular and unique
humanitarian instances” in which the State was not liable under the law. 135
Second, a Claims Headquarters Officer (‘Kamat Tov’anot’) at the MOD also has
the authority to compensate Palestinian claimants due to damage caused by
military actions.136 Per MOD officials, though, this function is rarely invoked.137
Given the limited scope of these alternatives, they do not suffice to provide
redress for injured Palestinians.
In sum, while the Israeli tort system managed to compensate a significant
number of injured Palestinians during the 1990s, mostly through confidential
out-of-court settlements, over the last 15 years, due to an expansion of the
combat exclusion and procedural restrictions applied to Claims, it has become
extremely limited. The data I collected emphasized the politicization of the
Claims as a key explanation for their demise. Since alternative paths for
compensation are also quite limited, Palestinians are left nowadays without any
real prospects for redress.

B. U.S.-Iraq and Afghanistan
On May 29, 2006, on a steep road leading down from Bagram Air Force
Base into Kabul, the brakes of a twenty-ton armored truck in an American
133

134

135

136

137

As a rule, the Committee only reviews cases of bodily harm. It pays compensation for property
damage only in rare instances that resulted in “extreme financial distress,” and as long as it finds
that “considerations of security or diplomatic relations” warrant the compensation. See STEIN,
B’TSELEM, supra note 7, at 15.
For instance, in one case, the Court noted: “I won’t deny that I find the outcome I’ve reached
difficult. The law tries to do justice yet law and justice are like two only partially overlapping
circles . . . . The State would do right if despite the outcome of this judgment it would find a way
to compensate the plaintiffs as a tribute of ex gratia.” CC (Acre) 3055/97 Husun v. The Ministry
of Defense (2001) (Isr.).
Working Procedure and Guidelines for the Committee Acting under the MOD concerning Ex
Gratia Payments (2011) (on file with author). Per MOD data, between 2004 and 2014 the total
amount awarded by the Committee was 575,895NIS (~$154,000), in 42 cases (20 cases were
dismissed). Data are unavailable prior to 2004. Report in Response to MOD FOIA Query, Aug.
3, 2015, http://perma.cc/U548-FJ6H (Hebrew); Report, supra note 123.
This authority is based on Order Concerning Claims (Judea and Samaria) (no. 271), 1968 (Isr.). See
information on IDF MAG Force website, available at: http://www.idf.il/en/minisites/militaryadvocate-generals-corps/about-the-mag-corps.
Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview with GL8, MOD
(Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author).
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convoy failed. The truck crashed into the city, killing at least one person and
injuring dozens of others. An angry crowd gathered at the scene and a riot
began. In the crossfire, bullets that the Pentagon later traced to American
weapons killed at least six young Afghan men, including a 13-year-old boy selling
pizzas on the street.138 Since, contrary to the Israeli model, it is nearly impossible
for foreign nationals to bring a tort lawsuit against U.S. military forces before
U.S. courts,139 military claims commissioners paid damages to the families of the
six men under a different mechanism—the Foreign Claims Act (FCA),140 which
provides the U.S. military its main tool to compensate local civilians for losses
unrelated to combat operations.141

1. The Foreign Claims Act (FCA)
Offering monetary payments to foreign civilians harmed by U.S. military
operations is a long-established practice, conceived of as a way to build the good
will of the local population and help the military achieve its objectives.142 Civilian
claims for harm became a part of military operations when Congress passed the
Indemnity Act (American Forces Abroad) in 1918, which allowed U.S. military
forces to provide monetary payments to civilians injured by U.S. military
vehicles in France.143 Due to the geographical limitations of the 1918 Act, which
focused on remunerating citizens of allied countries, Congress passed the Armed
Forces Damages Settlement Act in 1942, later adjusted to become the FCA in

138

139

140
141
142
143

ACLU, Claims Filed Under the Foreign Claims Act by Civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, Army
Bates No. 18–22, 30–51, (Released by the ACLU Apr. 12, 2007), http://perma.cc/C6KY-RJKT
[hereinafter ACLU FOIA Report].
This is due to a host of limitations, including a justiciability limitation on political questions and a
broad immunity enjoyed by the U.S. government and service members. See Kenneth Bullock,
United States Tort Liability for War Crimes Abroad: An Assessment and Recommendation, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 145–53 (1995) (discussing the various limitations on U.S. liability for harm
caused to foreign civilians). For a recent, rare example of a successful case, see On Eve of Trial,
Psychologists Agree to Historic Settlement in ACLU Case on behalf of Three Torture Victims, ACLU (Aug.
17, 2017), http://perma.cc/S3B8-32DK (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). Another historical exception
is the Abandoned and Captured Property Act. This federal statute authorized individuals to file
claims against the U.S. to obtain compensation for property seized during the Civil War. See
Elizabeth Lee Thompson, Reconstructing the Practice: The Effects of Expanded Federal Judicial Power on
Postbellum Lawyers, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 306 (1999) (discussing the Act and its impact on lawyers
and courts). The Court of Claims decided more than 1500 cases arising under this statute between
1868 and 1875. Id. See also James G. Randall, Captured and Abandoned Property During the Civil War,
19 AM. HIST. REV. 65 (1913); THOMAS H. LEE & DAVID L. SLOSS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 131–32 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2017).
Witt, supra note 88, at 1456.
Id.
Id. at 1458.
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1956.144 The revised version made the Act available to any civilian who might be
considered ‘friendly’ to U.S. interests. This change was especially important
during the Vietnam War, when the FCA was mobilized to support noninsurgents.145
The purpose of the FCA is “to promote and to maintain friendly relations
through the prompt payment of meritorious claims.”146 It only allows payments
to civilians harmed by “negligent or wrongful act[s]”147 committed by uniformed
personnel or civilian employees of the Department of Defense, excluding
contract employees.148 While the FCA applies all over the world, including in
active combat zones, much like the Israeli Act it forbids payments for harm
resulting directly or indirectly from combat,149 an exception known as the
“combat exclusion.”150 Furthermore, the FCA is perceived by the U.S. as an ex
gratia program, as payments are not distributed based on any legal obligation.151
FCA claims may be filed for damage to real or personal property, personal
injury or death incurred by acts carried out by U.S. military forces.152 The claimsmaking process is fairly standardized. When harm to civilians occurs as a result
of military actions, soldiers are instructed to provide victims with information on

144

AMSTERDAM INT’L LAW CLINIC & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 29. Under
the 1942 Foreign Claims Act a maximum of $1,000 could be awarded to a successful claim.
However, when that amount proved too small to fulfill the law’s purpose, the War Department
(which in 1947 split into the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy and Department
of the Air Force) offered support for a change to the legislation, and successfully convinced
Congress to amend the FCA. Id.

145

Foreign claims offices became so important in Vietnam that when payments were delayed in
1970, a riot broke out. Witt, supra note 88, at 1468. Importantly, the FCA should be distinguished
from the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. The FTCA is the principal
mechanism for individuals to bring tort claims against the U.S. government for torts committed
by federal agents. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 includes a set of exceptions, including the “combatant
activities” exception and the “foreign country” exception. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)–(k). For more on
the FTCA, see generally GREGORY SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2016).
10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2000).

146
147
148

149

150
151
152

US Dep’t of Army, Reg. 27-20, Claims, Feb. 8, 2008, ¶ 10-3(a).
JONATHAN TRACY, CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY & CAMPAIGN FOR INNOCENT
VICTIMS IN CONFLICT, COMPENSATING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: “I AM SORRY FOR YOUR LOSS, AND
I WISH YOU WELL IN A FREE IRAQ,” http://perma.cc/QB8Q-P2UT. For the compensation
regime in Iraq regarding private contractors, see Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New
Accountability Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 259 (2008).
Combat activities are defined as “[a]ctivities resulting directly or indirectly from action by the
enemy, or by the Armed Forces of the United States engaged in armed conflict, or in immediate
preparation for impending armed conflict.” US Dep’t of Army, Reg. 27-20, supra note 147, at 107.
See KEENAN & TRACY, supra note 16.
TRACY, supra note 148.
See KEENAN & TRACY, supra note 16.
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how to seek a claim. Such information is sometimes distributed on a card
containing instructions in English and the local language. Victims then need to
complete a claims form, which can be obtained in Government Information
Centers and includes date, name, age, citizenship, place of residence, and
employment details for victims as well as details regarding the incident itself. 153
At times, sworn affidavits by soldiers at the scene are included. Most important
to the claims process are the written significant act reports (or spot reports filed
by phone) that U.S. soldiers are mandated to complete whenever an incident
involving harm to civilians occurs, since more credence is placed on evidence
provided by the U.S. military.154 Once a claim has been submitted, it is reviewed
by a Department of Defense attorney to determine whether it meets the
necessary criteria, which requires, in addition to the non-combat condition, that
the claimant would not be an enemy of the U.S. or provide aid to an enemy. 155
Claims are evaluated by Foreign Claims Commissions (FCCs), composed of one
to three officers, usually judge advocates.156 Claims up to $10,000 may be
approved by an officer or employee appointed by the secretary concerned
(namely, the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines). Claims above
that amount require a higher approval through the chain of command. In
general, claims are capped at $100,000. However, if the Secretary concerned
believes that a claim exceeding that amount is meritorious, the amount in excess
can be reported to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment.157
Since 2003, the average payment for loss of life under the FCA is $4,200. 158
In Iraq and Afghanistan, $30–35 million have been awarded under the FCA
between 2001 and 2007.159 Of the 490 claims made between 2005 and 2006 in
these countries, 404 were denied.160 This considerable figure may be related to
153

“A separate victim report may also be sought, with interpreters called upon to facilitate.” Emily
Gilbert, The Gift of War: Cash, Counterinsurgency and ‘Collateral Damage,’ 46 SECURITY DIALOGUE 403,
405 (2015), citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-699, MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN (2007), http://perma.cc/GB99-EY4F, at 33–34.

154

TRACY, supra note 148, at 56. Other documents that may be included in an FCA claim are journal
entries, maps or hand-drawn diagrams of the scene, and photographs of damaged vehicles and
sometimes victims. Gilbert, supra note 153, at 406.
Also, the claim must be filed within two years of the date the harm was incurred, similar to the
Israeli limitations period. TRACY, supra note 148, at 74.
The Department of Defense designates one branch of the military to adjudicate claims for a
particular location. 10 U.S.C. § 2734.
AMSTERDAM INT’L LAW CLINIC & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 29.

155

156

157
158
159

160

KEENAN & TRACY, supra note 150.
See id.; Paul von Zeilbauer, Confusion and Discord in U.S. Compensation to Civilian Victims of War, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2007), http://perma.cc/6VRV-2F8Q.
Witt, supra note 88, at 1471.
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problems applying the FCA standards in a consistent fashion.161 Not only is the
“friendliness” of a victim difficult to determine—especially in a
counterinsurgency context, where, as noted, the line between civilian and
combatant is often blurred—but so are the boundaries of the combat exclusion,
which is a common basis for denying claims.162 For instance, damages arising out
of terrorist assassinations—which are likely excluded by the FCA—may be
denied in one case, but compensated in another.163 While some checkpoint
shootings are treated as combat exclusion cases, others are resolved on the
merits as either negligent or benign shootings.164 As Jonathan Tracy concludes,
these inconsistencies create the distinct sense of arbitrariness in the application
of the FCA.165

2. Condolence payments
Since the Korean War, the U.S. has also maintained the ability to pay for
civilian damages in incidents deemed combat-related through an alternative tool,
called “solatia” or “condolence” payments.166 The main difference between solatia
and condolence is that solatia payments are funded by a unit’s Operations and
Maintenance fund,167 while condolence payments come from the Commanders’
Emergency Response Program fund.168 Both types of payments are given to
civilians as an expression of sympathy for the harm they suffered.169 Each time
161

KEENAN & TRACY, supra note 16.

162

Gilbert, supra note 153, at 406. As stated in one rejected claim, ‘[t]he U.S. cannot pay your claim
because your brother’s death was incident to combat. I am sorry for your loss, and I wish you well
in a Free Iraq.’ TRACY, supra note 148, at 3. See also Major Michael D. Jones, Consistency and
Equality: A Framework for Analyzing the “Combat Activities Exclusion” of the Foreign Claims Act, 204
MIL. L. REV. 144 (2010) (offering a critique, based on the author’s experience as a Chief of Clients
Services in Iraq in 2006, on the way the FCA is applied, and suggesting a framework for analyzing
claims involving the combat exclusion).
See ACLU FOIA Report, supra note 138, at Army Bates No. 732 - 733.

163
164

Compare id. at Army Bates No. 785 - 786, with id. at Army Bates No. 762. In at least one case, army
claims personnel stated that there is a presumption of combat exclusion when U.S. soldiers fire
weapons. Id. at Army Bates No. 656 - 659. And yet, other claims for shooting deaths and injuries
were compensated without mentioning such a presumption. Id. at Army Bates No. 385 - 388.

165

CIVIC, ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: US MILITARY CLAIMS SYSTEMS FOR CIVILIANS 3 (2007), cited
in Witt, supra note 88, at 1473 (noting that “The FCA ‘combat exclusion’ appears to be applied
arbitrarily”).
10 U.S.C. § 2736 (2004).

166
167

168
169

Army regulations provide the authority for payments: “Payment of solatia in accordance with
local custom as an expression of sympathy toward a victim or his or her family is common in
some overseas commands.” U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 27-20, Claims, Jul. 1, 2003, ¶ 10-10.
TRACY, supra note 148.
These payments were also customary in Vietnam, when the “going rate for adult lives was $33.
Children merited just half that.” Cited in Gilbert, supra note 153, at 407.
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the U.S. goes to war, a decision is made as to whether payments to victims or
their families are appropriate in that country.170 In its report on monetary
payments, the Amsterdam Law Clinic explains how “[a]t the beginning of both
the Afghan and Iraq wars, U.S. Central Command [] declined to authorize the
payments, leaving no claims system” outside the FCA regime.171 Later on,
though, the Department of Defense determined that payments are customary in
both countries.172 After that determination, until 2007, U.S. armed forces paid
approximately $30 million in condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan
civilians.173 In Iraq, maximum individual payments are $2,500 for a death, $1,000
for a serious injury, and $500 for property loss or damage.174
Like FCA payments, condolence payments are considered a gesture of ex
gratia, intended to ease civilian suffering, rather than provide formal reparation,
legal compensation, or admission of fault or negligence.175 The individual or unit
involved in the damage has no legal obligation to grant these payments, and, in
fact, the soldiers or Marines who were present at the time of the aggrieving
incident do not participate in the process at all.176 Compared to an FCA claim,
there is a lower evidentiary threshold for condolence payments, and payments
can also be made when an FCA claim has been denied.177 However, even once
condolence payments were introduced in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. army
170

Jeremy Joseph, Mediation in War: Winning Hearts and Minds Using Mediated Condolence Payments, 23
NEGOT. J. 219, 224–25 (2007).

171

AMSTERDAM INT’L LAW CLINIC & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 14.
This determination was based on a cultural evaluation of whether such payments would be
considered appropriate. In September 2003, the highest level of Command in Iraq (Combined
Joint Task Force-7) authorized what it called “solatia-like” payments. In November 2005,
condolence payments were approved for use in Afghanistan. Id. While a November 2004 memo
by the Defense Department authorizes condolence payments in Afghanistan and Iraq, other
sources suggest that the army began making condolence payments in Iraq in September 2003, five
months after the invasion. Witt, supra note 88, at 1463.

172

173

174

175

176
177

Witt, supra note 88; GAO-07-699, supra note 153. Exact data are unavailable for later dates. Nick
Turse, Blood Money: Afghanistan’s Reparations Files, THE NATION (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://perma.cc/8B69-SV67.
U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. AND SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 270 (2007), http://perma.cc/38Y5-UEB4; Witt, supra note 88, at 1463. Payments
may be authorized up to $10,000 by a higher command. AMSTERDAM INT’L LAW CLINIC & CTR.
FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 15.
Condolence payments are described as ‘symbolic gestures.’ U.S. Army, Money as a Weapon System
Afghanistan, USFOR-A PUB 1–06, at 125 (Feb. 2011). See also CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT,
BACKGROUNDER: US “CONDOLENCE” PAYMENTS (2011), http://perma.cc/D43D-RTD5.
Joseph, supra note 170, at 244.
Gilbert, supra note 153, at 407; Karin Tackaberry, Judge Advocates Play a Major Role in Rebuilding Iraq:
The Foreign Claims Act and Implementation of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 2004 ARMY L.
39, 43 (2004).
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referred only a small fraction of the combat-excluded cases for condolence
payments.178 Payments are distributed shortly after an aggrieving incident
occurred, are generally nominal,179 and are paid either in cash or as in-kind
expressions of sympathy through goods and services.180
There are many examples of inconsistencies with respect to condolence
payments.181 A condolence payment is viewed as precluding a subsequent FCA
claim in one case but not in the next, though the FCA seems to support the
latter approach.182 In one case, when a U.S. forces car killed two members of the
same family, a maximum of $7,500 should have been claimable.183 However,
extraordinary circumstances were found, and—for undetermined reasons—a
total of $10,000 was awarded.184 As Ganesh Sitaraman concludes, “[b]ecause the
condolence process is discretionary and decentralized to the level of particular
commanders, the procedures and application have been inconsistent and largely
ad hoc.”185 As a result, much like the FCA regime, the condolence process is
highly uneven in application.

IV. P ROMISES AND P ERILS IN C IVILIAN C OMPENSATION :
E VALUATING THE M ODELS
How should we think about these two distinct models for civilian
compensation, against the backdrop of the goals and benefits of tort law on the
one hand, and its limitations on the other? Which model provides more effective
remedies? Which one better responds to victims’ needs and motivations and to
the unique difficulties asymmetric conflict settings entail? And how does each do
in terms of promoting government accountability? Through the two models, I
consider the role monetary compensation assumes in asymmetric conflict,
offering implications for designing programs that address the harm such
conflicts cause to civilians.
178

Army judge advocates appear to have granted condolence payments in only 70 of the 233
combat-excluded claims in the ACLU FOIA request files from 2005 and 2006. Witt, supra note
88, at 1472.

179

Joseph, supra note 170, at 224.
Witt, supra note 88, at 1463.

180
181

Id. at 1472–76. The differential values attributed to death and injury appear to be the result of an
“arbitrariness” of accounting. Id. at 1472.

182

ACLU FOIA Report, supra note 138, at Army Bates No. 546 - 549.
GAO-07-699, supra note 153, at 25.

183
184
185

Gilbert, supra note 153, at 409.
Sitaraman, supra note 12, at 1794. Geographical location or the kind of incident—night raid or
airstrike, for example—can also impact the access to soldiers to make a claim, providing yet
another reason for inconsistency. Gilbert, supra note 153, at 410.
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As explained above, the Israeli model has gone through significant
changes, resulting in a much more restrictive compensation policy. In many
ways, the changes this mechanism underwent are related to its susceptibility to
public opinion, as the relative transparency of the claiming system exposed it to
political pressures. This susceptibility may be considered in and of itself a flaw of
this model—a side effect of the injuring state judging its own actions during an
ongoing conflict. Yet, it is also an inevitable feature of any system rooted in
democratic values. In this Part, though, I reflect—from a normative
perspective—on the values promoted and problems evoked by the Israeli
mechanism when it was still functional, during the pre-Second Intifada era. I
seek to conduct this reflection behind a veil of ignorance as to the eventual
demise of this model.
I first examine the potential benefits derived from the Israeli model in its
original form. These benefits can be ascertained through Palestinian plaintiffs’
motivations to pursue tort litigation in Israeli courts. My interviews with such
plaintiffs and their lawyers suggest that a variety of motivations undergirded
their decision to pursue litigation. First, acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the
part of the State of Israel.186 As one lawyer put it, “even when the State doesn’t
pay, it’s a process of taking responsibility, acknowledging wrongdoing.” 187
Second, information seeking; the hope that through the legal proceeding,
particularly the discovery process, plaintiffs will learn more about what
happened to them or their loved ones.188 In the words of one lawyer, “there is
the issue of knowing what exactly happened. It’s not that [the plaintiffs] don’t
know what happened but still the legal process allows lots of information they
don’t have to become available and that means a lot to people who have lost
their loved ones or that were injured themselves.”189 Third, vindication of rights;
the opportunity to stand on equal footing with state representatives, those they
view as responsible for the incident.190 This is also related to victims’ desire to
act upon a perceived injustice, and the realization that other courses of action
are unavailable.191 A final motivation was compensation itself, particularly in
situations in which the victim was the breadwinner or when plaintiffs lack other
186

187
188
189

Interview with GB, Plaintiff (Jul. 2015) (notes on file with author); Interview with PL9 (Dec.
2015) (notes on file with author); Interview with PL16 (Mar. 2016 ) (notes on file with author).
Interview with PL4 (Mar. 2015) (notes on file with author).
Interview with CF, Plaintiffs (Jul. 2015) (notes on file with author).
Interview with PL9 (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author).

190

Interview with BA, Plaintiff (Jul. 2015) (notes on file with author); Interview with PL2 (Sept.
2014) (notes on file with author).

191

PL9 noted that some people direct their frustration towards violence, while others seek legitimate,
non-violent ways to cope with it. Interview with PL9 (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author).

Winter 2019

409

Chicago Journal of International Law

resources to recuperate from the incident. As one plaintiff explained, “[i]t was
never my intention to file except my husband was the breadwinner.”192 Though
the Israeli tort system did not always deliver on all these promises, its capacity to
do so encouraged plaintiffs to resort to the courts.
Another benefit of the Israeli model is its potential to promote
accountability for military actions in the Territories and in some cases even a
change of practices. Plaintiffs’ lawyers emphasized the significant role tort
litigation plays in this regard, particularly since criminal charges are rarely ever
brought against soldiers.193 Senior lawyers in the field noted the gradual change
in the military’s approach towards maintaining records of actions in the
Territories; primarily how record keeping became much more rigorous. The
lawyers noted further that the military introduced more careful rules of
engagement and supervision of soldiers’ conduct. They attributed this change, at
least in part, to the wave of lawsuits brought against the military following the
First Intifada.194 The role of the Claims in inducing this change was
acknowledged by government lawyers too.195 One government lawyer provided a
concrete example. She mentioned that, in the 1990s, there were many
checkpoint-related aggrieving incidents between Border Police Unit soldiers and
Palestinians. Soldiers humiliated individuals during physical searches, cursed, and
spat. Through the Claims, the DA became aware of these incidents and began
pushing the Unit’s commanders to revise procedures and increase soldier
supervision. According to that lawyer, these incidents did wane in later years.196
Yet, lawyers on the State’s side have also noted the difficulties associated
with managing a tort case under the circumstances of conflict. A senior MOD
lawyer mentioned the severe lack of information on the defendant’s side due to
the inability to verify the reliability of medical records provided by plaintiffs. As
he put it, “I’m often fighting with my hands tied.”197 These difficulties are
exacerbated by soldiers’ lack of cooperation: either they are hard to get a hold of
after being released from duty, do not remember what happened during a

192

Interview with MJ, Plaintiff (Aug. 2015) (notes on file with author).

193

Interview with PL4 (Mar. 2015) (notes on file with author); Interview with PL2 (Sept. 2014)
(notes on file with author); Interview with NGOL2 (Aug. 2014) (notes on file with author).

194

Interview with NGOL7 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview with PL17 (Feb. 2016)
(notes on file with author); Interview with PL2 (Sept. 2014) (notes on file with author); Interview
with PL3 (Jul. 2015) (notes on file with author).
Interview with GL5, DA (Aug. 2015) (notes on file with author).

195
196

Interview with GL2, DA (Aug. 2014) (notes on file with author). GL2 mentioned that some
lawsuits have even resulted in disciplinary proceedings to soldiers involved.

197

Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan. 2016) (notes on file with author). See also Interview with GL9,
IDF (Dec. 2016) (notes on file with author).
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chaotic situation,198 or are reluctant to take part in the legal proceeding.199 Finally,
the State often experiences difficulties getting to the scene of the incident to
investigate the case, as this may involve mortal danger.200 These evidentiary
problems, the State argued during legislative proceedings, give rise to “situations
of practical inability to defend against lawsuits, as well as false claims and
plaintiffs’ attempts at fraud, while the state lacks the means to expose falsehoods
and distinguish them from claims that are based on facts that did occur.”201
As discussed above, these difficulties in applying tort litigation to conflictrelated settings prompt the competing no-fault model, used by the U.S.
military.202 This model does not require elaborate discovery, soldiers’ oral
testimonies, nor damages calculation. Like insurance, these payments are
bureaucratic—based on information recorded on standardized forms and
administrators’ decision-making.203 Yet, here too, there are drawbacks, which I
argue are even more troublesome. There is no recognition of responsibility on
the part of security forces in appropriate cases, nor is there an opportunity for
victims to articulate their stories, experience empowerment, or solicit
information from the other side. The amounts allocated are ordinarily limited in
size, and—particularly when it comes to symbolic payments—may be perceived
as unsatisfactory, even insulting, compared to the scope of injury.204

198

Interview with GL4, DA (Aug. 2014) (notes on file with author); Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan.
2016) (notes on file with author); Interview with GL8, MOD (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with
author) (noting the use of polygraph as one way to handle evidentiary gaps).

199

Interview with GL11 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with author). When soldiers do testify in trial, this
creates another set of problems given the need to keep their identities confidential. Interview with
KS1 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview with GL11, DA (Mar. 2016) (notes on file
with author).
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Cited in STEIN, B’TSELEM, supra note 7, at 43.
Draft Bill for Addressing Claims Arising from Activity of Security Forces in Judea and Samaria
and the Gaza Strip (Exemption from Liability and Paying Compensation), 5757-1997 (Isr.). Later,
the State began hiring private investigators to expose false claims. Interview with GL4, DA (Aug.
2014) (notes on file with author).
These challenges reportedly led the State to push for a sweeping no-fault mechanism to replace
the tort-based system in the 2005 Amendment. See Section III.A supra. Unlike the existing Ex
Gratia Committee, which typically addresses non-combat incidents (Working Procedure, supra
note 135; Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan. 2016) (notes on file with author); STEIN, B’TSELEM,
supra note 7, at 15), the 2005 Amendment purported to apply to both combat and non-combat
incidents. Ronen, supra note 12, at 218 n.171.
Paul Langley, Uncertain Subjects of Anglo-American Financialization, 65 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 67
(2007).
As Ronen notes, the practice of ex gratia payments “demonstrates that even when payment is
voluntary and entirely at the discretion of the states, they do not exhibit great benevolence.” Supra
note 12, at 216.
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It should not come as a surprise, then, that not all victims welcome these
payments. For instance, in response to a massacre conducted in 2012 by a U.S.
soldier in the Panjwai district, near U.S. military Camp Belambay in Afghanistan,
the brother of one of the victims was recorded as stating: “I don’t want any
compensation. I don’t want money, I don’t want a trip to Mecca, I don’t want a
house. I want nothing. But what I absolutely want is the punishment of the
Americans. This is my demand, my demand, my demand and my demand.”205 In
another incident in Helmand province, Habiburrahman Ibrahimi reports that
one of his Afghan interviewees, Ismail, was ‘enraged’ by monetary payments
offered by the military.206 In his words, “Afghans must seem like animals to the
Americans if they can put prices on them . . . . If someone killed an American
and offered to pay $10,000, would they accept it?”207
These statements speak to victims’ desire of retribution, the lack of
accountability attached to the U.S. model, and the payments’ small size. In this
sense, since money can and does indicate an acknowledgement of responsibility,
symbolic amounts can be perceived as an insult to victims; an attempt on the
injurer’s side to trivialize the gravity of the injury. Worse yet, monetary payments
can constitute a ‘license to injure’ of sorts, allowing states to risk causing harm to
civilians so long as they subsequently buy out their injuries. Paired with the lack
of evaluation of the cause undergirding the claim, these payments can be viewed
almost as a cost of doing business, precluding any real potential for
accountability. These concerns also relate to the question of who decides when
and how much to pay. No matter the quality of training provided to military
officers in charge of distributing payments, it is still the case that those
responsible for the harm inflicted are being tasked with making decisions
regarding how that harm should be valued and who should pay for it. There are
no mechanisms in place for review or monitoring,208 and, as noted, little
transparency is provided regarding the process of allocating payments.209 These
205

Mirwais Harooni & Rob Taylor, Afghanistan’s Karzai Slams US over Massacre, REUTERS (Mar. 17,
2012), http://perma.cc/TYX7-8AUY.

206

Habiburrahman Ibrahimi, Afghan Anger at US Casualty Payments, INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://perma.cc/PW8H-EYFG.
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Id. Relatedly, recalling his experiences as a military judge advocate in Iraq from January 2002 to
April 2005, Jonathan Tracy noted that ‘every Iraqi I spoke with on the issue expressed shock and
disbelief I could only offer $2,500 for the death of a human being. Not one Iraqi ever said the
amount made sense, or was equitable.’ Tracy later became an advocate at the Campaign for
Innocent Victims in Conflict. See his 2009 testimony Assistance for Civilian Casualties of War: Hearing
Before Subcomm. Of the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 37 (2009) (statement of Jonathan
Tracy, Associate Director, National Institute of Military Justice) http://perma.cc/H5UX-CVRT.
As the FCA stipulates, “[b]y accepting payment, claimant releases the U.S. government, and its
employees and contractors, from future liability or claims.” GAO-07-699, supra note 153, at 51.
Gilbert, supra note 153, at 410.
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characteristics cast doubt on the extent to which such a mechanism can
effectively promote accountability. In the absence of serious post-event
assessment of liability as a check on soldiers’ behavior, a concern arises for
moral hazard; that soldiers will not take all necessary precautions to avoid
anticipated harm and venture unwarranted risks.
Furthermore, the process by which military payments are paid does not
allow victims to experience the aforementioned benefits. As Jeremy Joseph
notes, since condolence payments are handed out with minimal interaction
between soldiers and victims, there is no process of reconciliation.210 In this
context, a comparison to the practice of diya payments in Islamic legal doctrine
(fiqh) is informative.211 Rather than turn to the death penalty in the event of a
murder, victims can choose to accept diya: fixed but generous monetary values
determined based on a sliding scale, similar to that used with condolence
payments.212 Yet, military payments differ considerably from diya with respect to
process, as the latter is used to express forgiveness.213 Not only does the
perpetrator acknowledge responsibility for the harm caused, but the decision to
accept payment is determined in consultation with victims.214 This attention to
victims’ perspective is absent from the military payments system.
The lack of victim participation is closely tied to the goals behind these
payments, which are not conceived of as an obligation but rather as an
expression of sympathy, humanity, and goodwill, aimed at supporting the
military objective of “winning the hearts and minds” of the local population.215
The target audience of the payments is thus the Afghani or Iraqi public rather
than the direct victim. The term frequently used to describe these payments, ex
210
211

212

213

214
215

Joseph, supra note 170, at 224.
The doctrine incorporates an “underlying and fundamental concept of compensation for life, limb
and property.” WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARĪ`A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 309 (2009).
Gilbert, supra note 153, at 407. On solatia and diya payments in Iraq, see Keith Brown, “All They
Understand Is Force”: Debating Culture in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 110 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 443
(2008).
Hisham M. Ramadan, On Islamic Punishment, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW: FROM CLASSICAL
TO CONTEMPORARY 43 (Hisham M. Ramadan ed., 2006). A requirement is that fair compensation
is negotiated so that the victim’s honor is restored. See HALLAQ, supra note 211, at 310.
Gilbert, supra note 153, at 407.
In a report from 2010, the Center for Civilians in Conflict noted that “[i]n Iraq and Afghanistan,
the United States has found that monetary payments made to civilians harmed express sympathy,
dignify losses, and track with US principles of humanity and compassion.” See CTR. FOR CIVILIANS
IN CONFLICT, UNITED STATES MILITARY COMPENSATION TO CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT
(2010), http://perma.cc/B4G6-8QQU. This is made explicit in the guidelines for military
payments for Afghanistan, which state that “[c]ondolence payments can be paid to express
sympathy and to provide urgent humanitarian relief to individual Afghans and/or the Afghan
people in general.” U.S. Army, supra note 175, at 125.
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gratia, is Latin for “out of kindness,” denoting the lack of legal duty attached to
them. Resentment towards this approach to victim compensation is expressed in
the perceptions of Israeli plaintiffs’ lawyers towards the Ex Gratia Committee
discussed above, which is used as an alternative to the Israeli court-based
mechanism.216 According to several lawyers, these proceedings are perceived as
demeaning, as they reflect the view that victims can be dismissed with no more
than symbolic payments that underestimate the full extent of their suffering.217
Some plaintiffs’ lawyers also doubted the objectivity of the Committee218 and
expressed concern that it allows the State to “have the cake and eat it too,”219 in
the sense that it projects so-called consciousness to victims’ suffering without
constituting a meaningful check on military decision-making. As Israeli MOD
officials themselves acknowledged, it is also problematic from the victims’
perspective that their claims are decided by military personnel, whom they view
as part of the system responsible for their injury.220 Given these views, it is not
surprising that this mechanism is rarely used.221 These perceptions of ex gratia

216

See Section III.A, supra.

217

Interview with PL4 (Mar. 2015) (notes on file with author) (noting he refuses to take part in these
proceedings); Interview with PL12 (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author) (noting with regard to
the Ex Gratia Committee that he is unwilling to participate in this “ugly game” and that he views
it as “condescending.”); Interview with PL7 (Aug. 2014) (notes on file with author) (mentioning
an instance in which the State was unwilling to offer an ex gratia payment, since the case had
received much public attention and there was concern that such a payment would imply accepting
responsibility for the incident). PL13, who typically represents Palestinian corporations, noted
that the small amounts paid by the Committee would not assist in restoring the damage caused to
his clients. Interview with PL13 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with author).
Interview with PL10 (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author).

218
219

Interview with NGOL9 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview with PL9 (Dec. 2015)
(notes on file with author) (noting that the Committee does not grant victims any
acknowledgment of the State’s wrongdoing as there is no admission of guilt on the part of the
State).

220

See remarks by GL7 with regard to the military function of ‘Kamat Tov’anot’ noted in Section
III.A., supra. Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan. 2016) (notes on file with author). See also Interview
with GL8, MOD (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author).
Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview with GL8, MOD
(Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author) (also noting the scarcity of information available on the
Committee); supra note 135. Interestingly, my conversation with a senior MOD lawyer revealed
that the State believes Palestinians are not applying to the Ex Gratia Committee because they
have other sources of compensation available. Interview with GL7, MOD (Jan. 2016) (notes on
file with author). A noteworthy example of a case in which the Committee did provide
compensation is that of 3-year-old Maria Amman, who was severely injured and lost her family in
a targeted killing attempt in Gaza. She received a legal immigration status in Israel, a substantial
monthly stipend from the Israeli MOD, and full coverage of her extensive medical treatment in
Israel. See Interview with PL17 (Feb. 2016) (notes on file with author); Jacky Huri, HCJ: The
Palestinian Girl Maria Amman Remains in Temporary Status for Two More Years, HA’ARETZ (Mar. 25,
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compensation highlight this model’s ineffectiveness from the victims’
perspective and its inability to promote government accountability.
Table 1 below summarizes the differences between the two models,
highlighting the advantages and drawbacks of each model:
Table 1: Outcome- and Process-related Features of the Two Models
Process/ Criteria
Adjudicatory
Administrative
Model (faultModel (no-fault):
based): Israel
U.S.
Process
Legal
+
Variables
Representation
Claimants’ Voice
+
and Participation
Transaction Costs
+
Process
+
Lengthiness
Transparency
+-*
Third
Party
+
Neutral
Vulnerability to
+
Political Pressures
Outcome
Liability/ Blame+
Variables
Placing
Adequate
+
Compensation
+ = process ranks better on the criterion in question
* considering confidential out-of-court settlements, which are not transparent

As evident in Table 1, the administrative, no-fault model prioritizes
efficiency and durability over process and outcome fairness. The adjudicatory
model lies at the opposite side of this trade-off. The next Section discusses a
potential path forward considering the drawbacks of both models.

2015), http://perma.cc/G5MX-FSTP. This case attests to the type of exceptional cases in which
the Committee tends to intervene.
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V. P ATH F ORWARD : D ESIGNING E FFECTIVE V ICTIM
C OMPENSATION P ROGRAMS IN A SYMME TRIC C ONFLICT
Arising from these tensions is the question: Which system better responds
to the complexity of asymmetric conflicts? I contend that a compensation
program, apart from effectively providing compensation, needs to balance
government accountability and transparency with victims’ other needs and
motivations, including recognition, information, voice, and control. My analysis
suggests that there is real merit to a tort-based system, despite its flaws, given its
capacity for fact-finding, addressing victims’ needs, and prioritizing transparency
and accountability. As argued above, tort law’s process-related objectives and
benefits are just as important as—if not more important than—its outcomeoriented goals of monetary compensation, particularly in asymmetric conflict
settings.222 In some cases, tort lawsuits can even promote a change in military
practices. These significant benefits make the tort model, as a normative matter,
more attractive for the settings in question. While I do not purport to suggest an
elaborated, “one-size-fits-all” model to address civilian harm in asymmetric
conflict, nor do I believe such a uniform model is desired, I offer below several
guidelines policymakers ought to follow when designing compensation programs
in such settings. Importantly, these process-related recommendations should be
adopted alongside the guiding principle of providing adequate compensation to
injured civilians when there was fault in security forces’ actions.
Recommendation 1: Incorporating Victim Participation
The process must incorporate some form of victim participation, the exact
scope of which should be context-dependent. Indeed, tort litigation provides a
platform for injured, disempowered individuals to use their voice—even if they
do not ultimately prevail at trial. Forcing a court to seriously and publicly
consider a plaintiff’s position is in and of itself a dignifying experience for the
aggrieved. Furthermore, as civil recourse theory explains, plaintiffs are
empowered through the opportunity to stand on equal footing with and
confront their injurers. Therefore, when designing compensation programs in
asymmetric conflicts, policy makers should include a process for victim
participation, allowing victims to appear before the decision-maker, share their
stories, and hear from government representatives.223
222

223

See also Bachar, supra note 23 (arguing that a key component of the right to access to justice is the
right to the litigation process, rather than only its outcome).
Granted, victim participation can also be achieved through alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
procedures, like mediation. A mediation process may help obtain an apology from an official state
representative more effectively than litigation, and this may be very significant to some victims. A
story shared by an Israeli plaintiffs’ lawyer suggests the value of mediation in this respect. He
mentioned a case of a foreign human rights activist, killed by an Israeli military sniper in Gaza.
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Recommendation 2: Requiring Information Sharing
Litigation is also a platform for conducting factual and legal analyses of
military activity in ongoing asymmetric conflict, activity that is often only quasimilitary or even police-like in nature, and thus does not fall into the combat
exclusion. Policymakers should thus include in the process an opportunity for
plaintiffs to receive information about what happened to them or their loved
ones during conflict incidents. On the flip side, government representatives
should be required to expose such information except when deemed by a neutral
third party as confidential. Even in the latter case, there might be an option of
exposing partially redacted documents. This requirement will promote
transparency, accountability, and may even lead to change of practices in
appropriate cases.
Recommendation 3: Assuring the Neutrality of Third-Party Neutrals
It is crucial for policymakers to carefully consider the identity of third-party
neutrals given potential impediments to their objectivity. In particular, further
research is needed to assess the capability of judges from the injuring state to
successfully fulfill this role, and the conditions under which domestic civil courts
can assume this function. Taking into account political pressures that may be in
play, there is also a need for constitutional checks on states’ ability to erode a
tort-based compensation mechanism through procedural limitations, as was
done in Israel. The failure of the Israeli mechanism should serve as a cautionary
tale, emphasizing the need to carefully adapt the tort system to the reality of
asymmetric conflict. One option for such adaptation would be a panel of
decision-makers that includes a representative of the injuring state, a
representative of the injured individual(s), and a third-party neutral. Granting the
decision-making power, at least partially, to an objective third party, rather than
keeping it exclusively in the hands of the injuring state’s security forces, can
deemphasize the state’s power to wield discretion over harm that it has itself
inflicted.

The case was referred by the court to mediation, and following a mediation session, the
government lawyer turned to the victim’s mother to say that he is awfully sorry about what
happened to her son, who seems to have been an incredible person. In response, the mother
burst into tears and said that she has been waiting to hear those words for six years, since the legal
proceeding was first initiated. The case was eventually settled, like many other cases in the preSecond Intifada era. Interview with PL9 (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author). Yet, as explained
below (supra note 230), such procedures would have other significant drawbacks in asymmetric
conflicts. Finally, victim participation can also be incorporated into criminal accountability
mechanisms. See, for example, Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. &
POL'Y 229 (2005) (discussing the trend of victim involvement in the U.S. criminal justice system).
However, since the focus of this Article is on civil accountability, criminal accountability tools
exceed its scope.

Winter 2019

417

Chicago Journal of International Law

Recommendation 4: Devising an Opt-out Option
Despite the deficiencies of the no-fault system, the program design should
offer an opt-out option to turn to no-fault compensation.224 Such an opt-out
option will allow victims who value efficiency and speed more than they care
about the process elements of the program, such as participation and
information, to choose the no-fault route.
A persisting concern, though, is the prevalence of out-of-court settlements
in the shadow of the tort system.225 Under a settlement, similarly to a no-fault
model, while money is being disbursed that might be interpreted as an
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, there is often no explicit admission of guilt on
the part of security forces, nor is there an assessment of cause or intent.226 That
said, before a case is settled under the tort system, the stronger party—the
state—is still ‘dragged’ into court by much weaker plaintiffs.227 Furthermore, a
settlement may include a stipulation for a private apology. This suggests that
even considering out-of-court settlements, the existence of an objective
decision-maker still differs from a no-fault model, both in holding security
forces accountable, and in addressing victims’ needs. A tort-based system that
includes a process of negotiation and compromise also better ensures that
compensation is not projected as an act of generosity as under a no-fault model,
but as redress owed to victims in cases where there was fault in the state’s
conduct.228

224

The opting-out process should be carefully considered, though, given the 9/11 VCF experience
noted above, where plaintiffs had the opposite opportunity—to opt-out of the no-fault fund and
bring a tort lawsuit (under significant limitations)—and scarcely made use of this option. See
Hadfield’s findings, supra note 32.

225

As Witt points out, the decision-making in the U.S.’s military payments system is actually similar
to “personal injury lawyers and insurance company claims adjusters: using cash to settle civilian
claims against the armed forces.” Witt’s analogy to lawyers and insurers is made in an earlier
version of his 2008 article (Witt, supra note 88). See also H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF
COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 232–34 (1980); Samuel
Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of
American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1602–06 (2004).
In this sense, payment is “unconditional and contractual, no longer based on the notion of one
party’s responsibility.” Daniel Defert, ‘Popular Life’ and Insurance Technology, in THE FOUCAULT
EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 211 (Graham Burchell, et al. eds., 1991).

226

227

228

See Interview with PL4 (Mar. 2015) (notes on file with author) (noting benefits of the Israeli
system, even when cases are eventually settled); Interview with NGOL9 (Mar. 2016) (notes on file
with author); Interview with PL9 (Dec. 2015) (notes on file with author) (noting the process
leading up to the settlement of some claims before the Second Intifada era, which included the
State acknowledging its wrongdoing towards Palestinians).
From a theoretical perspective, as civil recourse theory argues, since tort law confers individuals a
power to pursue a legal claim alleging that they have suffered an injury flowing from a legal wrong
to them by another, it is a matter for the injured individuals to decide how they pursue their claim.
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Several vexing questions remain. First is the issue of confidentiality. As we
have seen through the Israeli model, confidentiality is often a requirement in
out-of-court settlements involving security forces, as it allows the state to avoid
public embarrassment in cases of misconduct.229 But should the state be allowed
to demand confidentiality as a pre-condition for compensation? Obviously,
confidentiality compromises accountability. In this sense, informal negotiations
and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings such as mediation—
conducted behind closed doors—would risk disadvantaging weaker parties.230
That said, confidentiality may allow authorities to admit guilt and acknowledge
wrongdoing in private in appropriate cases, which may be more important to
some victims than public accountability. Future research should thus gauge
conflict victims’ perceptions of confidential out-of-court settlements to better
assess this tool. Second, what should be the composition of the panel adjudicating
claims? Who should third-party neutrals be and how should they be selected?
Can the courts of the injuring state successfully serve?231 As noted, more
research is required to evaluate the adjudicatory body’s impartiality in such
contexts. Finally, various practical and procedural issues need to be addressed,
including legal counsel, translation services, the nature and scope of victims’
participation, and an appropriate physical environment to conduct hearings. The
availability of legal counsel, in particular, can help bridge some of the inherent
power imbalances pervading asymmetric conflicts.
Importantly, my recommendations should be applied based on the specific
conflict’s characteristics. A key feature to be considered is the purpose of

229
230

231

This can be done either through trial or through negotiation of settlement. Goldberg, supra note
35, at 604–05.
See discussion in Section IV, supra.
Indeed, using an ADR-based model would raise a host of concerns in this respect. As Owen Fiss
notes in his famous critique of ADR, these procedures often involve a good deal of coercion,
much like a civil analogue of plea bargaining (see Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1075 (1984) (critiquing the ADR movement for its pressure towards reaching a settlement)), and
tend to disadvantage weaker parties, particularly ethnic and racial minorities subjected to negative
biases (See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985) (arguing that because ADR procedures
frequently incorporate features that social science research has identified as facilitating prejudice,
the procedures would produce biased outcomes); and more recently, Gilat J. Bachar & Deborah
R. Hensler, Does Alternative Dispute Resolution Facilitate Prejudice and Bias? We Still Don’t Know, 70
SMU L. REV. 817, 818 (2017) (reviewing empirical research testing Delgado et al.’s hypothesis and
arguing that, “[i]n an era of increasing economic inequality and ever louder expressions of racial,
ethnic, and gender prejudice, we have a responsibility to learn more about how public policies that
continue to favor alternative dispute resolution are affecting less powerful groups in U.S.
society.”)).
A related fundamental psychological question, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is
whether societies (Israeli, American) can successfully judge their own actions amidst an ongoing
conflict in which each side is entrenched in its own victimhood.
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compensation, which, in turn, depends on the relationship between the injuring
state and the civilian population in question—be it a prolonged occupation or a
short-term military engagement. By examining the defining features of the
conflict and avoiding “one-size-fits-all” solutions, we can improve the design of
victim compensation programs to effectively address the implications of
asymmetric conflicts worldwide.232

VI. C ONCLUSION
The complex reality of asymmetric conflicts, taking place outside the
traditional battlefield and amongst civilian populations, prompts us to reconsider
adequate paths for coming to grips with harm to civilians. This Article compared
two archetypical models used by Israel and the U.S. to compensate civilian
victims in the context of such conflicts, bearing in mind the differences between
the type of military engagement in each case: a prolonged military occupation of
adjacent territories versus a short-term operation, miles away from the country.
On the one hand, as Witt maintains, “Tort law was hardly designed with the
functional imperatives of the military in mind.”233 The incompatibility between
tort law and military strategy raises difficulties in applying conventional tort
principles to claims arising from conflict settings. In the Israeli case, this
argument was used to justify curtailing tort lawsuits by Palestinians through both
procedural limitations and expansion of the combat exclusion, demonstrating
this model’s susceptibility to popular pressures. Moreover, even assuming we
could reconcile the basic tenants of tort law and the reality of twenty-first
century conflicts, tort law often struggles to achieve its goals even in areas where
it is expected to do best.234
On the other hand, the competing no-fault model raises even more
significant problems, in particular lack of accountability and transparency and
disregard towards victims’ role in the process. Though aimed at providing more
horizontal equality than torts, such programs are also characterized by
inconsistency,235 both in application of the rules governing eligibility and in
232

233
234

235

For an alternative, see the model suggested by Maya Steinitz for an International Court of Civil
Justice that would have jurisdiction to adjudicate transnational corporations’ human rights abuses.
See Maya Steinitz, Back to Basics: Public Adjudication of Corporate Atrocities Mass Torts, 57 HARV. INT'L
L.J. (2016) (Online Symposium).
Witt, supra note 88, at 1467.
Id. (citing E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences
in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990) (surveying domestic litigants’
(dis)satisfaction with the tort system)). See also critiques on the tort system, supra note 75.
See Engstrom, Lessons from the VICP, supra note 99 (arguing that no-fault regimes are no panacea,
as evident in the VICP case that failed to ensure predictability and speedier redress as it has
promised).
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damages allocation, leaving massive discretion to the military representatives
charged with decision-making. This comparison is further intricated by the
introduction of confidential out-of-court settlements between military
representatives and conflict victims under the tort system, which bear
resemblance to a no-fault system in their lack of transparency and failure to
promote accountability.
This complexity necessitates more empirical research surveying and
interviewing asymmetric conflict victims to evaluate their legal needs and
motivations. Studies emerging from the legal consciousness and dispute
processing traditions236 provide initial insights into such an evaluation. Gillian
Hadfield’s findings on the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, for example,
indicate that litigating respondents were searching for recourse more than they
were keen on having their voice heard in court or on a higher payout.237 Yet,
these findings require testing in an asymmetric conflict setting that would allow
evaluating victims’ motivations to pursue tort litigation, their perceptions of a
no-fault program, and additional aspects such as how victims conceive of their
losses, who (or what) they blame, and how they perceive the legal process they
encounter in terms of fairness and justice.238 Moreover, future research should
assess the ability of the injuring state’s courts to successfully serve as decisionmakers in conflict-related claims, vis-à-vis other potential third-party neutrals.239
I argued in this Article that, despite the flaws of the tort system, tort law is
valuable for asymmetric conflicts, due to its capacity to promote, in addition to
monetary compensation, both government accountability and victim
participation. Based on this finding, the Article offered several recommendations
that policy makers ought to follow when designing compensation mechanisms in
asymmetric conflicts.
Importantly, we must replace the ethos of providing compensation as a
tribute of ex gratia, with an entitlement owed to victims by states involved in
asymmetric conflicts in cases where there was fault on security forces’ part.
Notwithstanding the difficulty to reconcile tort law with the reality of the
battlefield, states involved in such conflicts should keep in mind that prudent
military strategy does not align with lawlessness and lack of accountability.

236

237
238
239

See, for example, HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING
TO LAW (1999); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990).
See Section II.C, supra.
Lind et al., supra note 234.
It is possible that more data would encourage us to consider other forms of third party neutral-led
processes rather than courts. Such processes would still be costlier than a no-fault system, perhaps
to the extent of serving as a deterrent from unnecessary military harm.
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Indeed, the traditional norms of protecting civilians in armed conflict as
expressed in IHL and HRL were not designed with the characteristics of twentyfirst century warfare in mind, a reality that entails mundane, quasi-military, and
even police-like contact with civilians. Addressing the needs of civilian victims
and the imperative of government accountability should thus be an inseparable
part of confronting the challenges of modern warfare.
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